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Introduction
The "Management" Viewpoint
If I were in charge, I'd drug test all you sons-of-bitches,
not just the athletes.'
- Robert Montgomery Knight
Bobby Knight's colorful and straightforward response to a stu-

1. Such was the response of Bobby Knight, head basketball coach at Indiana University,
responding to a student's question "do you think it's unfair to make athletes submit to drug

testing?" Feinstein, A

SEASON ON THE BRINK

at 45 (1986).
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dent's question illustrates the fervent emotions accompanying drug
testing in sports. Knight is not alone in favoring drug testing of athletes. In fact, the governing bodies of numerous sports organizations,
both amateur and professional, have attempted to implement such
testing with varying degrees of success. Knight has left to others the
task of articulating the arguments in favor of testing athletes for
drugs.
Many have come to Knight's aid. Arguments articulated in
favor of the drug testing of athletes include those offered in support
of the drug testing of employees in general. They include: a) maintenance of high worker (or athlete) productivity; b) avoidance of lawsuits caused by drug use; c) safety on the job (or field).'
Two additional arguments have been asserted in favor of drug
testing of athletes in particular. The first is the desire to produce a
good product-athletic events involving physically and mentally
healthy athletes rather than athletes using drugs. This interest has
been asserted to be particularly strong in the context of sports because "athletic competition [moreso than other pursuits] is directly
dependent upon the physical and mental well being of its participants.' The second is an employer's right to know matters affecting
the health of his or her employees, again asserted to be particularly
strong in the context of sports due to the increased significance of
physical health and performance.' This is underscored by the fact
that, in sports, success is measured in terms of wins and losses.
Other arguments have been made in favor of testing athletes for
drugs. Haywood Sullivan, owner of the Boston Red Sox, has asserted
a deterrence rationale-the need to keep the "innocent" innocent.'
Perhaps the most widely asserted argument in favor of such testing
2. See Goldsmith, To Test or Not to Test - Laws Provide Framework for Procedure,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1986, at S-2, col. 1.According to Goldsmith:
All employers obviously have strong incentives to take precautionary steps
against drug abuse. In addition to diminished productivity, drug dependent employees file disproportionate numbers of worker's compensation claims and endanger the safety of others on the job. But sports employers, in particular, have
an inherently stronger motivation to combat drug abuse, because athletic competition is directly dependent upon the physical and mental well being of its participants. As such, the sports employer has the same right to know about a
player's drug problem as he does to know about a knee injury.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Wong & Ensor, Major League Baseball and Drugs: Fight the Problem or the
Player?, II NOVA L. REV. 779, 804 n. 124 (1987) (citing I1In Baseball Suspended For
Drugs, Boston Globe, Mar. 1, 1986, at I, 30, col. 1, 6). Sullivan insists, "[w]e've got to find a
way to convince people'that this is the only way that will work. It seems that without fear,
nothing works. We need a unified mandatory testing program so that all the innocent ones will
be kept innocent." Id.
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is the interest in maintaining the integrity of, and positive public re-

actions to, the sports involved. 6
B.

The "Player" Viewpoint
We're in thepublic eye, and it all comes out. Nobody gives
a rap about Joe Blow or a neurosurgeon. I still
say you have
7
individual rights. This is America, not Russia.

As the response of New York Met first baseman Keith Hernandez makes clear, equally colorful arguments have been asserted

against testing athletes for drugs. These arguments often are based
on concepts of "individual rights." 8 More specifically, they are based
on: a) the American legal system's presumption of innocence; 9 b)
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures; 0 c) protec6. See infra Part IV for a discussion of this integrity/public relations interest.
7. Keith Hernandez, quoted in Wong & Ensor, supra note 5, at 813 n. 176 (citing Mets
Shocked But Pledge Support For Gooden, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1987, at B13, col. 5).
8. See Glasser, Right to Privacy is a Basic Principle, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1986, at S-2,

col. 5. Glasser wrote:
Bob Stanley pitches for the Boston Red Sox. As if that were not punishment enough, now his employers want him to submit to periodic urine tests.
Stanley's reaction was swift and to the point: "1 don't take drugs," he said, "and
I don't believe I have to prove I don't."
With that statement, Stanley aligned himself squarely with one of
America's oldest traditional values: the idea that general searches of innocent
people are unfair and unreasonable.
Suppose a baseball player smoked a marijuana joint on an off day and
tested positive a week later. Does that impair his ability to perform? If not why
is it his employer's business? And if smoking a marijuana joint on an off day is
not permitted, why is drinking the night before a game part of the accepted lore
of the sport? Indeed, if impairment of ability to function is the issue, why is it
permissible for sports executives to have a couple of martinis at lunch, but not
permissible for his employees, including ballplayers, to smoke a marijuana joint
during a lunch break? It seems to depend on what your drug of choice is.
There is one legitimate issue-job performance. Every employer, including
sports employers, has the right to expect their employees not to be drunk or
stoned or high on the job. But employers do not have the right to monitor their
employees' conduct off the job, or to subject people to bodily searches who are
not suspected of drug use affecting their performance.
9. Id. Glasser stated:
Proposals to conduct periodic body searches of everyone would require the
innocent to prove themselves not guilty. That is not the American way. Tests can
be useful as part of an overall program, but they should be narrowly limited to
those players who are reasonably suspected of using drugs in a way that impairs
job performance.
10. Id. As Glasser noted:
In demanding general searches of all their athletes, sports employers subscribed to the policy that "if you hang 'em all, you'll get the guilty." They do
that to satisfy what they perceive as a public-relations problem and they are
willing to sacrifice the rights and interests of the majority of players who are
innocent of any misconduct. They are like those prosecutors who defend warrantless wiretapping by suggesting that people shouldn't mind being wiretapped
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tion against unwarranted invasion of other privacy interests, such as
a person's interest in not being required to disclose aspects of his
private life which do not affect safety or job performance. Also of
concern is the arguable hypocrisy in prohibiting the use of drugs but
not prohibiting the use of alcohol. Alcohol is probably still sports'
biggest substance abuse problem." Notably absent also is prohibi2
tion of steroids.1
C.

The Celebrity Factor

The implementation of drug testing programs in the sports
world is complicated by the fact that the potential testees are often
celebrities.1a
1. Dwight Gooden.-For instance, in 1985, Dwight Gooden
catapulted to national stardom by becoming one of major league
baseball's most exciting and successful young pitchers.", In 1986,
though he did not perform well in the World Series, he remained a
by the government if they've got nothing to hide. But innocent people have
something to hide: their privacy. And they have something to protect: their interest against being recklessly stigmatized and accused as a result of a mistake.
Id.
I1. See, e.g., id. The general manager of the Minnesota Vikings has opined that abuse
of alcohol, not of other substances, is the biggest substance abuse problem in the NFL. Alcohol Abuse Cited, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1987, at A18.
12. See Bishop, Drug Testing Comes to Work, 6 CAL. LAWYER 29, 31 (April 1986).
Bishop quotes David Meggyesy, Western Director of the National Football League Players
Association, as saying: "NFL players view drug testing as a 'control issue' and a violation of
their rights. They also feel . . . that testing is hypocritical because the industry encourages the
use of performance-enhancing drugs-such as steroids and cortisone-that may have longrange ill effects." The NFL began testing for steroids in 1987. See infra Part II.
13. See Glasser, supra note 8. Glasser stated:
Professional sports may indeed provide role models for society. But one of
the things that sports employers ought to think about when they talk about role
models is the role model they are providing by abandoning fundamental rules of
fairness and subjecting innocent and guilty alike to intrusive procedures.
In that respect, Bob Stanley's reactions provided a better role model for
traditional American values than Peter Ueberroth's attempt to coerce the innocent to abandon their rights.
Id.
14. See Gooden's Fall From Grace Saddens And Angers Fans, N.Y. Times, April 3,
1987, at BI, col. 2; Gooden Leaves Drug Treatment Center, Philadelphia Inquirer, April 30,
1987, at 2C, col. _;
Gooden Takes Another Step, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1987, at D20, col. 2;
Gooden Slated to Pitch in Minor-League Game, Wilmington News-Journal, May 8, 1987, at
B13; Judge Changes Gooden's Tests, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1987, at D24, col. 6 (Judge drops
court-ordered drug testing of Gooden for random tests directed by major league baseball);
Alfano, Gooden to Return to a Circus at Shea, N.Y. Times, June 5, 1987, at D19, col. 1;
Durso, Gooden Is Focus of "Concern", N.Y. Times, July 24, 1987, at BI 1, col. 3; Gooden
Says That He Still Drinks Beer-Occasionally, Philadelphia Inquirer, July 25, 1987, at 4-C;
Philadelphia Inquirer, July 19, 1987, at 6-E (through games of July 17, 1987, Gooden had 7-2
won lost record in his comeback with the Mets and the third lowest E.R.A. (at 2.41) of National League pitchers with six or more decisions).
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star with the world championship New York Mets.'8 In 1987, after

being released from a drug rehabilitation center and pitching in the
minor leagues, he made a widely chronicled comeback to the major
leagues. 6 As of this writing, he sports a winning record, but is again
drinking alcohol (beer), the activity which some allege eventually led
to his drug problem." Under a random testing scheme directed by
major league baseball, Gooden is being tested two or three times per
week for drugs.1 8 If Gooden tests positive, he is likely to incur the
severe penalties of a suspension from baseball, probably without pay,
and the cancellation of his probation in Tampa, Florida, where in
December 1986 he was arrested after fighting with police officers. 9
2. The Phoenix Suns.-Drug abuse problems have extended
beyond baseball stadiums. The Phoenix Suns of the National Basketball Association (NBA) completed their 1986-87 season as mediocre

also-rans. For some Suns players, however, the regular season's end
provided no respite from woe; a number of them were indicted for
drug use, and one voluntarily admitted, a second time, to cocaine
20

use.

3. Gary McLain.-In the spring of 1985, Gary McLain
basked briefly in the brilliant glow of his undermanned Villanova
squad's shocking victory over an imposing Georgetown lineup for
college basketball's national crown. In 1987, McLain shocked the
nation again by admitting that he had a lengthy history of drug
abuse and was "wired" on cocaine while at the White House. 2 '
4. In General.-Gooden, the indicted Suns, and McLain
shared the experience of being linked to drug abuse in national head15. See supra note 14.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Berkow, Sports of the Times-The Perfect Place, N.Y. Times, April 25, 1987,
at 53, col. 1; Goldpaper, Three Suns Pass Drug Tests, N.Y. Times, April 21, 1987, at B7, col.
4; Asher, 3 Suns Players Are Indicted In Drug Probe, Washington Post, April 18, 1987, at
DI, col. 5 (All-Star forward Walter Davis once again acknowledged he had a substance abuse
problem); Another Indictment Is Expected In Suns Drug Investigation, Washington Post,
April 19, 1987, at C5, col. 1; Agent Says Four Granted Immunity, N.Y. Times, April 20,
1987, at C3.
21. McLain Tells of his Drug Use at 'Nova, Philadelphia Inquirer, March 11, 1987, at
I; Gary Mclaine's Story-A Player Trapped By His Addiction, Philadelphia Inquirer, March
11, 1987, at GI; Revelations Leave 'Nova Coach Massimino "Crushed", Philadelphia Inquirer, March 1I, 1987, at __
. McLain, as told to Marx, A Bad Trip (The Downfall of a
Champion), SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, March 16, 1987, front cover & pp. 42-46.
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lines. If McLain had graduated two years later, they would have
shared another experience with drug testing. Athletes from high

school onward receive extensive media and public attention and scrutiny, often achieving celebrity status. Consequently, they are favored
spokesmen for public anti-drug campaigns. 2 Conversely, equally em-

phasized in the media are reports or allegations of drug use by athletes, especially stars, testing for such use, and even alleged knowledge on the part of athletes of drug use by others.2 3
D. Scope of Article

The fight against drug abuse has resulted in a proliferation of
employment-related anti-drug and drug testing measures2 ' and the
occasional extreme tactic. 5 Consistent with these developments
22. For instance, during the 1986-87 season, the National Basketball Association ran
television commercials featuring, among others, Isaiah Thomas, Kiki Vanderwehe, and Earvin
"Magic" Johnson exhorting viewers to "just say no" to drugs. See also Against Drug Abuse,
N.Y. Times, May 8, 1987, at BI. Ron Darling, pitcher for the then world-champion New
York Mets, made a public pitch against drug abuse.
23. See supra notes 2-4; Berkow, The Testing of L.T., N.Y. Times, July 24, 1987, at
BI 1, col. 1; Goldberg, Taylor: Giants Knew of Drug Use, Wilmington News-Journal, July 24,
1987, at C4; Parcells: 2d Thoughts on Taylor's Drug Use, Philadelphia Inquirer, July 25,
1986, at 3-C; Three Strikes and He's Back, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, March 2, 1987, at 18;
Bosworth Faces the Music, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 5, 1987, at 21; Washburn Doing Better, Philadelphia Daily News, March 6, 1987, at _
; Goodwin, NBA Will Hear Richardson
Plea, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1987, at A25, col. 5; Moore, Michael Ray Working Way Back to
NBA, USA Today, June 26, 1987, at Cl; Howe Signs With Texas, Will Report to Farm
Club, Philadelphia Inquirer, July 13, 1987, at Cl; Bias Trial Hears Defense, N.Y. Times,
June 2, 1987, at D27, col. 1; Cox, Rangers Looking Forward to Howe's Return to Mound,
Wilmington News-Journal (The Morning News), July 14, 1987, at C6; Apparent Drug Relapse, N.Y. Times, April 29, 1987, at C6 (re Tony Collins, a running back for the New England Patriots); Armbrister, We Can Conquer Cocaine, Readers Digest, Feb. 1987, at 65 (Tony
Robinson, former quarterback for the University of Tennessee, pleads no contest to selling
cocaine and is sentenced to six years probation); Two Eagles Tell of Drug Use, N.Y. Times,
April 25, 1987, at 52; Vermeil: Drug Evidence Lacking, Wilmington News-Journal, April 25,
1987, at B3; Football, Philadelphia Inquirer, July 25, 1987, at 4-C (Jerry Robinson, linebacker for the Los Angeles Raiders, arrested for alleged possession of cocaine); Drug Testing:
Baseball's Burning Issue, U.S.A. Today, Feb. 21, 1987 [hereinafter Baseball's Burning Issue];
Comment, Your Urine Or Your Job: Is Private Employee Drug Urinalysis Constitutional In
California, 19 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1451, nn. 1, 2, 5 (1986) [hereinafter Your Urine Or Your
Job] (citing additional articles concerning athletes and drugs).
24. See Philadelphia Inquirer, June 21, 1987, at 27-A (House of Representatives adopts
307-103, an amendment requiring drug testing of State Department diplomats who hold top
security classifications); Wilmington News Journal, June 30, 1987, at A3 (Federal Transportation Department advises its employees it plans to institute "various types of drug testing");
National Federation of Federal Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(Department of Defense's mandatory drug urinalysis program for certain civilian employees);
Feliciano v. Cleveland, No. 85-3356 (N.D. Ohio, June 12, 1987); Patchogue-Medford Tchrs.
Cong. v. Bd. of Ed., 70 N.Y.2d 57, 510 N.E.2d 325, 517 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1987) (compulsory
urinalysis testing of probationary public school teachers); National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987) (compulsory urinalysis of U.S. Customs Service
employees seeking transfer to certain sensitive positions).
25. In one instance, law enforcement officials used a warrantless helicopter surveillance
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outside of sports, drug testing measures of athletes have also proliferated as numerous athletic organizations have undertaken to test
participating athletes for prohibited substances." Due perhaps to
this proliferation and the celebrity factor, the questions of whether
and under what circumstances athletes should be tested for drugs
have become controversial national issues, often played out in the
nation's newspapers. 7
This Article will examine a variety of such drug testing programs enacted by various athletic organizations, the legal challenges
that have been made thus far to the validity of those programs, and
the legal and public policy issues accompanying drug testing. First,
this article will focus on the programs themselves. It will then discuss the challenges and the issues arising from them.
II. The Programs
A.

Illustrative Provisions: Horse Racing
The pertinent horse racing regulations of the State of New

Jersey28 are illustrative of five subjects typically covered in sportsrelated drug testing programs: 1) authority to test, 2) testing standard and selection method, 3) sanctions, 4) prescription exceptions,
and 5) confidentiality.

1. Authority to Test.-All such programs contain substantive

provisions mandating or permitting testing. New Jersey's horse racing regulations permit the state racing steward to direct any official,

jockey, trainer, or groom to submit to breathalyzer

9

and urine 0

of a greenhouse located on a residential curtilage. California v. Sabo, 185 Cal. App.3d 845,
230 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2200 (1987).
26. See infra Part II.
27.

See. e.g., Baseball's Burning Issue, supra note 23.

28. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 70-14A.10 et seq. (1985).
29. Id. The breathalyzer regulation provides:
Officials, jockeys, trainers and grooms shall, when directed by the State
Steward, submit to a breathalyzer test and if the results thereof show a reading
of more than .05 percent of alcohol in the blood, such person shall not be allowed to continue his duties. The steward may fine or suspend any participant
who records a blood alcohol reading of .05 percent or more. Any participant who
records a reading above the prescribed level on more than one occasion shall be
subject to expulsion, or such penalty as the stewards deem appropriate.
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 70-14A.10 (1985).
A similar regulation has applied to harness racing drivers since 1969. See N.J. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 13, § 71-18.1 (1985); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1138 n.l (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
30. The urinalysis regulation provides in pertinent part:
Every official, jockey, trainer and groom for any race at any licensed racetrack may be subjected to a urine test, or other non-invasive fluid test at the
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testing to detect alcohol or drug consumption.
2. Standard and Selection Method.-Facially, both the
breathalyzer regulation and the urinalysis regulation merely permit
testing at the direction of the state steward. 1 Neither regulation requires an individualized suspicion of substance abuse.32 For example,
the breathalyzer regulation has been implemented in such a way that
jockeys must take a breathalyzer test daily; however, grooms, trainers, and officials are tested less frequently. 3 The urinalysis regulation has been implemented by using random selection. The names
of all participating jockeys in a given race are placed in an envelope. 5 Each day, by lottery, three to five names are chosen from that
envelope, and those jockeys selected are tested that day. 6 Consequently, while all jockeys are at risk of being tested each day, not all
are selected on any given day."'
3. Sanctions.-The regulations specify sanctions for discovered users of prohibited substances." A first violation of the
breathalyzer regulation results in a fine or suspension to be determined by the state steward. 9 A second violation results in "expulsion or such penalty as the stewards may deem appropriate."40
The sanctions for violations of the urinalysis regulations typify
some sports-related drug testing programs in that they envision a
"three time loser" scenario under which harsher sanctions are imposed for each subsequent violation of the program. Under these regulations, a first violation of the urinalysis regulation results in a written reprimand, written warning, and subjection to future mandatory
testing."'
A second violation requires enrollment in a treatment prodirection of the State Steward in a manner prescribed by the New Jersey Racing
Commission. Any official, jockey, trainer or groom who fails to submit to a urine
test when requested to do so by the State Steward shall be liable for the penalties provided in N.J.A.C. 13:70-31.
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 70-14A.I 1(b) (1985).

31.

See supra notes 29, 30.

32.
33.

Id.
Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1139 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct.

577 (1986).
34.
35.
36.
37.

38.
39.
40.

41.

Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1140.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1143.
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, 70-14A.10 (1985).
Id.
Id.
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 70-14A.ll(d)(2) (1985).
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gram. 41 The violator is permitted to continue his job unless the Executive Director of the New Jersey Racing Commission, or his designee, determines that it would be detrimental to the best interests of

racing.4a
A third violation results in penalties such as denial or revocation
of the license to race, monetary fines, suspension, expulsion, or even
conditions to licensing to secure compliance with the rules." However, the Racing Commission has the discretion to permit the viola-

tor to enroll in a treatment program in lieu of those sanctions. 45
4. Prescription Exception.-Like other sports-related drug
programs, the program contains a "prescription" exception, which
allows potential testees to use, without sanction, otherwise prohibited
drugs lawfully obtained from licensed treating physicians.4 6 The burden is upon potential testees to notify competent authorities of the
medical justification under which they obtain and use the
substances.""
5. Confidentiality.-Also typical is the presence of confidentiality provisions. The program limits disclosure of results in four
ways.4 8 It limits a) the purposes for which information obtained
42.

N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 70-14A.i I(d)(3) (1985).
43. Id. Failure to provide written notice of enrollment, weekly status reports and written
notice of completion of the treatment program results in additional penalties. Id.
44. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 70-31.3 (1985).
45. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 70-14A.II(d)(4) (1985). Refusal to submit to a urine
test when requested results in additional penalties. See id. note 44 and accompanying text.
46. New Jersey's prescription exception provides:
(a) No licensee or official shall use any Controlled Dangerous Substance as
defined in the "New Jersey Controlled Dangerous Substance Act," N.J.S.A.
24:21-1 el seq., or any prescription legend drug, unless such substance was obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order from a licensed physician, while acting in the course of his professional practice. It shall be the
responsibility of the official, jockey, trainer and groom to give notice to the State
Steward that he is using a Controlled Dangerous Substance or prescription legend drug pursuant to a valid prescription or order from a licensed physician
when requested.
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 70-14A.I I(a) (1985) (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. The disclosure standards of the program provide:
(e) Any information received in the process of obtaining a urine sample,
including but not limited to medical information, the results of any urine test,
and any reports filed as a result of attending a Supervisory Treatment Program
shall be treated as confidential, except for their use with respect to a ruling
issued pursuant to this rule, or any administrative or judicial hearing with regard to such a ruling. Access to the information received and/or reports of any
positive results and/or reports from a Supervisory Treatment Program shall be
limited to the Commissioners of the New Jersey Racing Commission, the Executive Director and/or his designee, Counsel to the Racing Commission and the
subject, except in the instance of a contested matter. In the instance of a con-

92

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

SPRING

1988

under the regulations may be used, b) the persons entitled to access
such information, c) the length of time for which such information
may be preserved, and d) the manner in which it is to be stored.49
The regulations permit use of such information only in connection with rulings pursuant to the program or with judicial hearings
concerning such rulings. 50 Access to information concerning uncontested matters is limited to commission officials, counsel to the Racing Commission, and the subject of the test in question. 51 Disclosure
of information concerning contested matters is permitted only upon
the approval of the Commission Executive Director or his designee.5"
Information produced pursuant to the program must "be stored in a
locked secure area in the office of the Executive Director for a period
of one year, after which time [it] shall be destroyed."53
However, the Commission may maintain information received
and reports prepared on individuals who violate the provisions of the
program "for the purpose of recording the number of violations and
the results of supervisory treatment, and for use should future violations occur."' 4 The program places no limit on how long such information may be preserved or used.55
B. Harness Racing
New Jersey's administrative regulations create a comparable

program governing harness racing. The harness racing program contains similar breathalyzer56 and urinalysis 57 regulations. Penalties for
positive breathalyzer tests are the same, 58 as are penalties for positested matter, any information received and reports prepared shall not be disclosed without the approval of the Executive Director or his designee.
(f) Information received and reports prepared pursuant to this rule shall be
stored in a locked secure area in the office of the Executive Director for a period
of one year, after which time, they shall be destroyed. However, the Commission
may maintain the information received and reports on individuals who have violated this rule for the purpose of recording the number of violations and the
results of supervisory treatment, and for use should future violations occur.
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 70-14A.1l(e),(f) (1985).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 70-14A.l l(e) (1985).
52. Id.
53. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 70-14A.II(f) (1985).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 71-18.1 (1985).
57. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 81-18.2 (1985).
58. Compare N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 71-18.1 (1985) with N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13,
§ 70-14A.10 (1985).
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tive urinalysis tests.

9

The two programs contain similar prescription

0

exceptions and similar confidentiality provisions.6 1 A series of challenges to the legality of New Jersey's horse racing program is dis62
cussed in Section III of this Article.

C. Boxing
Boxing is governed by a number of separate and often contentious governing bodies. 8
1. Authority to Test.-New Jersey's boxing regulations mandate urine tests in three situations." ' First, boxers in New Jersey
must undergo urinalysis testing as a condition of licensure or renewal
of licensure.65 Second, they must undergo urine tests twice on the

day of each bout, once at the weigh-in and again "in the evening, a
short while before the boxing program commences."6 6 Third, the
regulations require boxers who are knocked out to undergo urinalysis
before entering the ring again.67
In two situations, the regulations allow physicians to order urine
tests.68 The first situation isa post fight medical examination.6 9 The

regulations require boxers to undergo such examinations and permit
the examining physician to order urine testing as part of that
exam.70 The second situation involves examinations after a boxer

sustains severe injury or actual knockout in a bout.7 The regulations
59. Compare N.J. ADMIN.
13, § 70-14A.II(d) (1985).

CODE tit. 13,

§ 71-18.2(d) (1985) with N.J.

ADMIN. CODE tit.

60. Compare N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 71-18.2(a) (1985) with N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit.
13, § 70-14A.11(a) (1985).
61. Compare N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 71-18.2(e), (f) (1985) with N.J. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 13, § 70-14A.l 1(e), (f)(1985).
62. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D. N.J. 1985), aff'd, 795 F.2d
1136 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
63. Among these are the World Boxing Association, the World Boxing Council, and the
International Boxing Federation. Oates, Kid Dynamite, LIFE MAGAZINE, March 1987, 65, 70.
64. See infra notes 65-74 and accompanying text. The New Jersey boxing regulations
are codified at N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, §§ 46-12.1 - 12.6 (1986 Supp.).
65. The boxing regulations state "A boxer, as a condition to licensure or to the renewal
of licensure by the State Athletic Control Board, shall undergo a thorough physical examination." N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 46-12.1(a) (1986 Supp.). The examination must, in "all
cases ... include ... a urinalysis." N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 46-12.1(b) (1986 Supp.).
66. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 46-12.2(a) (1986 Supp.) states, in pertinent part, "[a]ll
boxers in all bouts must be given a medical examination ... on the day of the bout, both at
the weighing in and in the evening .... In all cases, the examination shall include ... a
urinalysis."
67. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 46-12.6(b)(1) (1986 Supp.).
68. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 46-12.5(a) (1986 Supp.).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 46-12.6(a) (1986 Supp.).
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require a medical examination within twenty-four hours of such injuries or knockouts and permit the examining physician to order urine
testing as part of the exams. 72 Finally, the regulations empower the
State Boxing Commissioner "at his discretion" to order urine tests
"at any time for the purpose of determining [a boxer's] continued
fitness and qualification to engage in a boxing contest. 7 3s The regulations do not require an individualized suspicion of drug or alcohol
74
use for this testing.
2. Substance List.-The range of prohibited substances is very
broad.75 Prohibited are "any drug, narcotic, stimulant, depressant, or
76
analgesic of any description or alcohol substance.
3. Sanctions.-The regulations contain sanctions for drug use
and refusal to submit to testing." For instance, they prevent any
applicant from gaining a license unless a physician appointed by the
State Athletic Control Board certifies his fitness to engage in a boxing contest. 78 Presumably, this would prevent individuals with positive "condition of licensure" tests, or those who refuse to take such
tests, from gaining licensure. In addition, positive tests showing drug
use before or after bouts results in "immediate disqualification of the
boxer from the match and an indefinite suspension from boxing.
Refusal to submit to prefight or post fight testing results in the same
sanctions.8" To date, there have been no challenges to the legality of
these regulations.81
D. Baseball 2
In contrast to the situation in professional football and basketball, major league baseball (MLB) has in effect no agreement ex72. Id.
73. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit.
74. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit.
75. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit.
76. Id.
77. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit.
78. Id.

79. N.J.
80. N.J.

§ 46-12.1(d) (1986 Supp.).
13, § 46-12.2 - 12.6 (1985).
13, § 46-12.3(a) (1986 Supp.).
13,

13, § 46-12.1(e) (1986 Supp.).

ADMIN. CODE tit.13,
ADMIN. CODE tit. 13

§ 46-12.e(a) (1986 Supp.).
§ 46-12.3(b) (1986 Supp.); N.J.

ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, §
12.5(b) (1986).
81. This is probably attributable to the grave risks of serious accidents and injuries in
boxing. Imwinkelried, Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Wisdom of Governmental Prohibition or Regulation of Employee Urinalysis Testing, 11 NOVA L. REV. 563, 572-73 (Winter
1987); see also Shoemaker v. Handel, 608 F. Supp. 1151, 1158 (D. N.J. 1985).
82. A law review article was recently written concerning the status of drug testing in
professional baseball. See Wong & Ensor, supra note 5.
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pressly governing drug testing of its players. 83 Despite a history of

player involvement with drugs84 and imposition of drug testing on a
number of players by the Commissioner as discipline for drug use,85
a stalemate currently exists between players and management concerning drug testing of major league players. 86

The stalemate is not attributable to lack of a management desire to test or a historical lack of testing proposals. In the past, both

the Commissioner's office and numerous individual teams have
sought to impose drug testing on the players. For instance, in June

1984, then Commissioner Bowie Kuhn outlined a drug testing policy
a) excluding several substances, b) incorporating a salary abatement
mechanism as punishment for drug use, and c) incorporating a reasonable suspicion standard for testing.8 The MLB owners declined
to adopt this program. 8

Subsequently, the management of the Los Angeles Dodgers and
San Francisco Giants mandated that all new player contracts contain a clause requiring players to submit to drug testing during the
83. See, e.g., The Application of San Francisco's Testing Ordinance to the San Francisco Giants Baseball Club and San Francisco's 49er's Football Club, San Francisco City Attorney Opinion No. 86-04 (March 28, 1987) (unpublished op. at 8) [hereinafter "City Attorney Opinion"]; Wong & Ensor, supra note 5, at 806-07.
84. See Wong & Ensor, supra note 5, at 792-99. According to the New York Times,
MLB Commissioner Peter Ueberroth "recently warned that the sport has a 'cloud called
drugs' over it." Goodwin, Issue and Debate; Should Baseball Have Mandatory Drug Testing,
N.Y. Times, November 13, 1985, at B14, col. I [hereinafter Issue and Debate]. The failure to
address the issue, according to Ueberroth, could jeopardize the game's support among advertisers and paying customers. Moreover, he predicted that, if left unchecked, drug use could
result in a scandal where drug dealers could blackmail players into compromising their efforts.
id.
85. See, e.g., Wong & Ensor, supra note 5, at 801-03.
86. Wong & Ensor predict that the stalemate will last into "the foreseeable future."
Wong & Ensor, supra note 5, at 811.
87. Kuhn's policy:
1. [E]xcluded marijuana, amphetamines, and alcohol. Players who were found
to be abusing these substances would continue to be subject to action by the
commissioner, and the union would continue to have the right to file grievances
in such cases.
2. A cornerstone of the new agreement was a salary abatement procedure to
penalize players who continued to use drugs. A player who asked for help with a
drug problem would receive full pay for the first 30 days of treatment and half
pay for the next 30 days. Beyond 60 days, if kept on the major league roster by
the club, the player would be paid at a rate of $60,000 a year, the minimum
salary.
3. A club that suspected a player of drug involvement would ask the player to
undergo examination. If the player refused, the evidence would be presented to a
review council, a panel that included drug counselors. The members of this council were to be selected by a joint committee of owners and players. If the council
recommended that the player undergo testing or treatment and the player refused, he would be subject to disciplinary action by the commissioner.
Wong & Ensor, supra note 5, at 792.
88. Id. at 795.
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regular season. 8 1 However, as a bargaining tactic, both clubs agreed
not to insert such clauses into player contracts. 90
After former major league pitcher Vida Blue was convicted of
possession of cocaine, then Commissioner Kuhn required him to submit to two years of mandatory drug testing.9" The matter was
grieved, but an arbitration panel upheld the Commissioner's
punishment.9 2
In June 1985, present MLB Commissioner Peter Ueberroth released a memorandum outlining a comprehensive set of proposed
guidelines to govern drug testing in MLB.9 3 The proposal did not
cover MLB players.9 Instead, the program covered "all Minor
League umpires and playing personnel; all full-time, year-round administrative and management personnel employed in the Minor
Leagues and by Major League Baseball; and all Major League managers, coaches, trainers, and umpires. '9 5 The memo appears to provide for testing on a mandatory basis.9" In July 1985, testing of those
MLB personnel who had agreed to be covered by the program began.9 7 However, MLB players, through the MLB Players Association (MLBPA), rejected the plan.9 8
In September 1985, Ueberroth asked all MLB players to submit
to voluntary testing and later sought MLBPA input for a voluntary
drug testing program, but his proposal stalled. 99 Meanwhile, the
mandatory testing program governing other MLB personnel, minor
league players, and other minor league personnel was extended to
89. Id. at 793. Leaders of the Major League Players Association were publicly incensed
over the news that several Dodger players-including Mike Marshall and Bill Russell-had
already signed contracts containing the mandatory testing provisions. See Issues and Debate,
supra note 84. The union had long opposed mandatory testing as a violation of player rights
and privacy. Id.
90. Wong & Ensor, supra note 5, at 793. Marvin Miller, the former union leader who
remains a key union negotiator, stated:
I think this kind of ploy by [Dodger owner Peter] O'Malley, [Al] Campanis
and the rest of them is simply a bold, bald PR ploy, saying, "We're more against
drugs than you are." And this was all resolved satisfactorily in baseball last year
in the agreement [for voluntary drug-testing]. What they've done is rake it up
and violate the law in the process.
L.A. Times, Jan. 25, 1985 (Friday, Home Ed.), Part III (Sports), at 1,col. 5.
91. Wong & Ensor, supra note 5, at 790.
92. Id. Kuhn, who served as commissioner from 1969 to October 1984, suspended eight
players for drug use; five of those rulings were modified or overturned through arbitration.
93. Id. at 796-97.
94. Id. at 797.
95. Id. at 796,
96. Id. at 797.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 798 n. 84.
99. Id. at 801. Ueberroth wrote to each of the 650 major league players after failing in
his efforts to get the players union to agree. See also Issue and Debate, supra note 84.
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cover minor league players in the winter leagues of Puerto Rico,
Mexico, and the Dominican Republic.'
In the 1986 preseason, Ueberroth initiated a flurry of activity
concerning drug testing of MLB players. First, he renewed his push
for a voluntary testing program.' Then, in a memo dated April 4,
1986, Ueberroth approved one club's testing program and was prepared to approve other club testing programs that could operate independently of his own testing program. 02 In addition, Ueberroth
again attempted to institute a mandatory drug testing program covering all MLB players, and, again, the MLBPA rejected his proposed program. 0 3
In a separate matter, Ueberroth imposed discipline on twentyone MLB players who had been involved in the Pittsburgh trial of
Curtis Strong, a Philadelphia caterer who had been convicted of selling cocaine to MLB players. 0 4 Each player was permitted to choose
between two sets of penalties.0' Submission to random drug testing
for the remainder of their MLB careers was included as part of one
set of penalties.' 06 All twenty-one players agreed to submit to the
Commissioner's penalties, but the MLBPA has grieved the matter to
an arbitrator.10 7 That grievance remains pending.
Drug testing clauses were inserted by clubs in over 550 new
players contracts in the space of a few months.' 0 8 In July 1986, however, an arbitration decision held that such clauses violate MLB's
collective bargaining agreement if not negotiated through the
MLBPA, thus voiding all of those clauses.' 0 9
E. Football
The National Football league (NFL) is governed by multiple
100. Wong & Ensor, supra note 5, at 801.
1o. id.
102. Id. at 800-801 n. 107.
103. Id. at 804. Ueberroth has argued that largely because of the Pittsburgh case, discussed infra nn. 104-07 and accompanying text, players were already guilty by association and
that wholesale testing was the only way baseball could prove itself drug-free. Issue and Debate, supra note 84.
104. Wong & Ensor, supra note 5, at 801-03.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 803.
107. Id. at 803-04,
108. In re Arbitration Between Major League Baseball Player Relations Committee
And Major League Baseball Players Associations, Grievance No. 86-1 (July 30, 1986) [hereinafter Roberts].
109. Soon after rendering this decision, the MLB Player Relations Committee fired the
author of the decision, Tom Roberts, as MLB's arbitrator. Wong & Ensor, supra note 5, at
806.
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documents, among them a collective bargaining agreement, a constitution, and bylaws. " ' These documents make it clear that testing is
allowed in certain situations and prohibited in others. "1 However,
they are unclear on whether testing may permissibly be required in a

number of situations. "

Two of the most significant questions the

documents leave unanswered have been resolved in arbitration. " 3

This section will discuss the program as reflected in the documents.
The arbitration proceedings will be discussed in Part III.
1. The Collective Bargaining Agreement.-The preeminent
NFL instrument of governance is the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which supersedes conflicting provisions in other NFL
governance documents."'
a. Express Permissibility Provisions.-The CBA contains

three provisions expressly addressing the permissibility of drug testing of NFL players by NFL clubs. " 5 Two of the three expressly
empower individual clubs to conduct certain tests." 6 The third ex-

pressly prohibits clubs from conducting certain tests. " The first
''empowering" provision expressly allows club physicians to conduct
urine tests during a player's standardized preseason physical examination. 1 8 The second empowering provision expressly requires play-

110. See NFL Management Council-NFL Players Association 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. I, § 1 [hereinafter 1982 NFL CBA]). The 1982 CBA was effective
July 16, 1982 through August 31, 1987. 1982 NFL CBA, id. at art. XXXVIlI, §§ 1-2. The
1987-88 regular season opened September 13, 1987. As of this writing, the 1982 CBA has
expired and there has been no agreement upon a new CBA. This Article will examine the
latest CBA in effect, the 1982 CBA. The NFLPA seeks "improvement in the [NFL's] existing
chemical dependency program." Wilmington News Journal, March 25, 1987, at C3. Gene
Upshaw, the executive director of the NFLPA, has been reported as saying he would "prefer a
plan like the NBA's which does not have random testing but provides for players to be banned
for life for continued offenses." Id.
111. See infra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 136-49 and accompanying text.
113. In the Matter of Arbitration Between National Football League Management
Council and the National Football League Players Association, re Post-Season Physical Examinations, (October 20, 1986) (Kagel arb.) (unpublished decision) [hereinafter Kagel]; In the
Matter of an Arbitration Among the National Football League Players Association and the
National Football League Management Council and the National Football League, (October
25, 1986) (Kasher, arb.) (unpublished decision) [hereinafter Kasher 1].
114. 1982 NFL CBA, supra note 110, art. I, § 1.
115. For a short, understandable discussion of the NFL drug testing program as reflected in the 1982 NFL CBA, see Bishop, Drug Testing Comes To Work, 6 CAL. LAWYER 29,
31 (April 1986).
116. 1982 NFL CBA, supra note 110, art. XXXI, § 5, id., Appendix D. The CBA contains no similar provision empowering the League to conduct such testing. Id., art. XXXI, § 7.
117. 1982 NFL CBA, supra note 110, art. XXXI, § 7. Interestingly, it does not expressly prohibit such testing by the League.
118. 1982 NFL CBA, supra note 110, art. XXXI, § 5, id., Appendix D. The CBA con-
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ers to submit to testing upon reasonable cause at the direction of
their club physicians. 1 9 The third provision prohibits "spot" drug
testing by clubs.12 0 Significantly, it does not expressly prohibit spot
testing by the League.
b. Substance List.-The CBA's list of substances for which
clubs may test is not exclusive, but by implication allows testing for
drugs.' 2 ' Players are, in fact, routinely tested for drugs during those

examinations.'
c. Penalties.-The CBA does not specify precise penalties for
positive drug tests or other confirmed drug use. 2 3 The most applicable penalty provision of the 1982 CBA appears to be article VIII,
section 1, which empowers the Commissioner to discipline players
for "conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in,
the game of professional football."'' In fact, there is a history of the
NFL Commissioner disciplining players and requiring them to submit to drug testing for confirmed drug use. 2 5 Also, the CBA empowers clubs to fine and suspend players for conduct detrimental to the
club. 12 A player may be disciplined only once for a single violation
tains no similar provision empowering the League to conduct such testing. Id., art. XXXI, § 7.
119. Id., art. XXXI, § 7.
120. The third provision states: "There will not be any spot checking for chemical abuse
or dependency by the club or club physicians." Id.
121. Appendix D of the CBA provides that included in the minimum preseason physical
will be a urine test which may:
Check for (including but not limited to):
- Protein
- Glucose
pH Factor
- Diabetes
- Renal Failure
- Gout.
1982 NFL CBA, supra note 110, Appendix D; see also Kasher 1,supra note 113, at 17.
122. Denenberg & Denenberg, Drug Testing From the Arbitrator's Perspective, 11
NOVA L. REV. 371, 378 (Winter 1987) [hereinafter Denenbergs]. In 1987, clubs began testing
for steroids. See id. An arbitrator has held that testing for anabolic steroids does not violate
the 1982 NFL CBA. Kasher 1,supra note 113, at 75-76. Rozelle's "augmented program,"
discussed infra nn. 146-51, states that "methodology is being developed to handle anabolic
steroids," but does not expressly say players would be tested for steroids. Press Release, Commissioner Rozelle Augments NFL Drug Program of Testing, Education, Treatment, Discipline, July 7, 1987 [hereinafter Rozelle release]; infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
123. See 1982 NFL CBA, supra note 110, art. VIII.
124. Id., § 1.
125. In recent years Commissioner Rozelle has disciplined at least twenty-four players
for conduct detrimental to the integrity of the game, mainly for illegal drug use. Kasher I,
supra note 113, at 37. Twice the Commissioner's imposed discipline was challenged, only to
be upheld both times. In at least seven cases, the Commissioner required the disciplined player
to submit to urine testing as a condition of continued employment in the NFL. Id.
126. 1982 NFL CBA, supra note 110, art. VI, § 1.
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because the Commissioner and a club may not both discipline a
player for the same act or conduct.1"7
d. Confidentiality.-The CBA contains a stringent confidentiality provision governing information obtained through the drug testing program."2 8 It requires the deletion of players' names on bills
sent to insurance carriers, and states that "[n]o information regarding a player's treatment will be publicly disclosed by

. .

.the facility

or the club.""
e. Postseason and Other Testing.-On its face, the 1982 NFL
CBA is unclear about the permissibility of postseason testing. It allows clubs to conduct postseason physical examinations, but does not
state whether they may test for drugs as part of those
examinations.'
In addition, it fails to address whether drug testing is prohibited
unless expressly permitted, or permitted unless expressly prohibited.
Also, it incorporates by reference provisions in the NFL Constitution
and Bylaws granting rights to the League and its individual clubs.'
Unclear, therefore, is the precise extent to which such "incorporated" rights empower the League or clubs to test in situations
where the CBA neither expressly allows, nor expressly prohibits,
testing. 32
i. IncorporatingProvisions.-The CBA contains a number of
incorporating provisions, including a "Management Rights" provision' which states that "[tihe NFL clubs maintain and reserve the
right to manage and direct their operations in any manner whatsoever, except as specifically limited by the provisions of this agreement."'3 4 This provision, on its face, could reasonably be construed
to empower NFL clubs to require drug tests not expressly prohibited
by the CBA.
A second incorporating provision is a "Full Force and Effect"
127. Id., art. VIII, § 5. Discipline imposed by the Commissioner supersedes discipline
imposed by clubs. Id., Art. VI, § 3; see also id., art. VII, § 11.
128. Id., art. XXXI, § 8.
129. Id.
130. The CBA provides: "If either the club or the player requests a postseason physical
examination, the club will provide such an examination and player will cooperate in such examination." 1982 NFL CBA, supra note 110, art. XXXI, § 5.
131. See infra notes 138-47 and accompanying text.
132. For a discussion of "incorporated" rights, see Id. See also 1982 NFL CBA, supra
note 110.
133. 1982 NFL CBA, supra note 110, art. I, § 4.
134. Id.
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provision1"5 which provides that documents which affect the terms
and conditions of the employment of NFL players and which are not

superseded by the CBA remain in full force and effect."3 6 This provision could reasonably be interpreted to mean that the CBA would
allow drug testing in situations where a) the power to test flows from
a separate NFL governance document, that is, from an "incorporated" provision and b) the CBA does not expressly prohibit testing.
ii. IncorporatedProvisions.-Provisionsin other NFL governance documents "incorporated" by the CBA's "incorporating provisions" grant powers to individual clubs, the League, and the Commissioner. 137 Arguably, these powers include the power to require
drug tests in some circumstances. For instance, the 1985 NFL Constitution and Bylaws states that "[a] Club, at its option, may adopt
individual club rules and regulations not inconsistent with or contrary to the Constitution and Bylaws of the League and/or the Rules
and Regulations of the League."'1 8 Furthermore, they allow the
league to "adopt rules and regulations.' 1 39 They empower the Commissioner to "interpret and from time to time establish policy and
procedure in respect to the provisions of the Constitution and Bylaws
and any enforcement thereof."' 40 In addition, they empower the
Commissioner, after notice and a hearing, to suspend or fine players
"guilty of conduct detrimental to the welfare of the League or professional football," or to cancel contracts between such players and
their clubs or the league.' 4 They also empower him to bar and prohibit from stadiums and parks any person whom he finds, in his sole
and exclusive discretion, to be "guilty of conduct detrimental to the
best interest of the league or professional football."' 4 In light of the
CBA's "full force and effect" incorporating provision, these incorporated provisions could reasonably be construed to empower clubs, the
league, and the Commissioner to require testing in addition to that
135. Id., art. I, § 2.
136. Id., art. I, § 2.
137. See 1985 NFL CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS, art. XI1, § 12.2(A) (quoted in Kasher 1,
supra note 113, at 8).
138. Id.
139. 1985 NFL CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS, art. XII, § 12.2(B) (quoted in Kasher 1,
supra note 113, at 8).
140. 1985 NFL CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS, art. VIII, § 8.5 (quoted in Kasher I, supra
note 113, at 6).
141. 1985 NFL CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS, art. VIII, § 8.13(A) (quoted in Kasher 1,
supra note 113, at 7).
142. 1985 NFL CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS, art. VII1, § 8.13(D) (quoted in Kasher 1L
supra note 113, at 7-8).
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expressly allowed by the CBA.
Furthermore, the CBA itself empowers the Commissioner to
discipline players for "conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or
public confidence in, the game of professional football"' 3 and empowers the Commissioner to resolve disputes concerning such Commissioner actions.'14 Player drug use certainly affects the integrity of
and public confidence in professional football. Hence, these provisions arguably empower the Commissioner to require drug tests in
addition to those expressly allowed by the CBA.
2. The Rozelle Release.-In July 1986, relying on his powers
under the CBA "integrity" provisions,'14 5 NFL Commissioner Pete
Rozelle sought to require tests in addition to those expressly allowed
by the CBA. He announced an "augmented" drug testing program
that included the following:
1. Appointment of Dr. Forest Tennant, Jr., a nationally recognized expert in the field of chemical-dependency treatment, as
NFL Drug Advisor and placing him in charge of the Leaguewide program.
2. Requiring more frequent urine testing, including two unscheduled tests during the regular season for every player in the
League.
3. Retaining SmithKline Bio-Science Laboratories (SKBL),
a nationwide network of clinical laboratories, to collect and analyze all specimens.
4. Placing all users of prohibited substances under medical
care as soon as identified through confirmed positive tests.
5. Assigning to Dr. Tennant and to SKBL the responsibility
for administering urine testing at the annual Timing & Testing
sessions in February, and of NFL players at preseason training
camps and in cases of reasonable cause ....
6. Establishing a set of procedures that in some cases will
provide for remedies while preserving the confidentiality of the
test results, in other cases will mean immediate removal of players who test positive from their teams' active rosters, and in4 ex6
treme cases will lead to a permanent ban from the league.'
a. Substance List and Penalties.-As to substances for which
players would be tested, the Rozelle Release stated:
143.

1982 NFL CBA, supra note 110, art. VIII, § 1.

144. Id. at art. VII, § 11.
145.

See Rozelle Release, supra note 122, at 2.

146.

Rozelle Release, supra note 122, at 1.
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Drugs to be tested for will include cocaine, marijuana, opiates
(e.g., heroin), PCP, amphetamines, and alcohol. Amphetamines
will be tested for but initially handled through education and

counseling. Alcohol is not prohibited but high levels of this substance and other indications of alcohol problems will lead to
treatment and possible discipline. Methodology is being developed to handle anabolic steroids, which will also be the subject
of educational programs developed by Dr. Tennant.'

The Rozelle Release also contains three penalty provisions.1" 8
The first two address non-criminal involvement with drugs and contemplate essentially a "three time loser" scenario in which each confirmed instance of drug use subjects the player to harsher penalties,
with the third violation resulting in a permanent ban from the
League. 1 9 The release also addresses criminal drug use.' 50 It states
that "each such incident will be handled on a case-by-case basis by
the Commissioner."15 1

3.

The Arbitration Decisions

a. Kagel.-Some of the most prominent issues raised by the
CBA's paucity of express drug testing provisions have been resolved
through the NFL's grievance and arbitration procedures. For instance, on October 20, 1986, arbitrator Samuel Kagel ruled that the
CBA impliedly prohibited NFL clubs from requiring players to submit to drug tests during postseason physical examinations and from
1 52
penalizing players who refused to be tested at that time.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 1.
Id.
The provisions state:
Any player evaluated as requiring hospitalization for substance abuse will
be removed from his team's roster for at least 30 days and will receive only half
pay during that period. Any player requiring hospitalization for a second time
will be removed for a minimum of another 30 days at no pay. If that player
relapses and tests positive again, he will be permanently banned from the NFL.
A player who requires out-patient care after a positive test and evaluation
will be tested on a continuing and confidential basis by Dr. Tennant for a minimum of 30 days at half pay, and a subsequent relapse and positive test will
permanently ban him from the NFL.

Id.
150. Id. at 2.
151. Id.
152. Kagel, supra note 113, at 33. Four clubs had sought to require their players to
undergo drug testing shortly before or after the final game of the season. Some also levied
$1,000 fines against players who refused to submit to a postseason urine test. See id. at 4;
Bishop, supra note 115, at 32. In addition to these measures, at least two clubs, the Green Bay
Packers and Buffalo Bills, asked players to submit to voluntary postseason testing. Bishop,
supra note 115, at 32. Management has not been alone in requesting voluntary testing. After
the January 1986 Super Bowl between the New England Patriots and Chicago Bears, the
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b. Kasher .- Five days later, arbitrator Richard R. Kasher
invalidated the provision in Rozelle's augmented program requiring
unscheduled regular season testing as violative of the CBA.158 However, he upheld most of the rest of the augmented program. 54
F.

Basketball

The National Basketball Association (NBA) has implemented a
drug testing program that is at once simple, comparatively respectful
of individual rights, cognizant of the beckoning lure of drugs, and
yet draconian. The NBA program is largely summarized in a single
passage of the NBA release describing it. 155
The Anti-Drug Agreement provides that any player who is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, a crime involving the use or distribution of heroin or cocaine, or is found, through the procedures
outlined in the Agreement, to have illegally used those drugs,
shall immediately be permanently dismissed from the league.
Such player may, however, appeal for reinstatement after two
years, requiring the approval of both the Commissioner and the
6
Players Association.

15

Two other provisions in the NBA release clarify the circumstances under which players may be tested involuntarily. The first
allows the NBA, upon "reasonable cause," to "administer prescribed
tests on four occasions during a six week period, such times to be
decided at the discretion of the NBA and without prior knowledge of
the player. 1

57

The second states:

[I]f a player misses one game or a combination of two team
flights and/or two practices within a one-week period, he must
report to the team within twenty-four hours and take a urine
test. If he tests positive or fails to submit to urinalysis, it is regarded as an additional violation of the Anti-Drug
players for the New England Patriots sought to adopt a drug testing program on their own. Id.
However, the NFL Players Association "vowed not to leave the situation up to individual
teams and filed a grievance with the National Labor Relations Board." Id.
153. Kasher I, supra note 113, at 72.
154. Id., at 72-78. As explained earlier, the primary discussion of these two decisions
takes place in Part Ill of this Article.
155. Release, The Anti-Drug Program of the National Basketball Association and the
National Basketball Players Association-Overview of the NBA's Anti-Drug Program (undated) [hereinafter NBA Release-Overview].
156. Id.
157. NBA Release, The Independent Expert, NBA Anti Drug Program (undated). For
more background on "reasonable cause" testing by the NBA, and a list of players who have
been banned from the NBA pursuant to such testing, see infra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
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Agreement."'8

Clearly, the number of substances subject to testing (two) is
very small.' 59 The first two voluntary admissions of drug use are
treated leniently.160 In essence, for players who voluntarily admit
drug use, the NBA program contains a three-time loser scenario not
involving testing. The first time a player comes forward, he continues
to be paid, is provided free counseling and medical assistance, and
suffers no other penalty. 6 The second time he is suspended without
pay.16 The third time he is banned. 6 '

Since involuntary testing requires either 1) a specific, verifiable
type of misconduct (missed games) or 2) a reasonable, individualized
suspicion of use (reasonable cause), players need not be concerned

about the intrusions presented by random testing.'" Reasonable
cause must be found by "an independeht expert experienced in the
field of drug abuse and enforcement,"'6
158.

5

rather than "interested"

NBA Release, Care & After Care Under the NBA's Anti-Drug Program

(undated).
159. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
160. See infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
161. The NBA release states:
Under the Agreement, any player who voluntarily comes forward to seek
treatment of a problem involving the use of drugs is provided with appropriate
counseling and medical assistance under the auspices of the Adult Substance
Abuse Program of the Van Nuys (Calif.) Community Hospital. In order to encourage players with problems to seek help, this treatment is provided at the
expense of the club, the player continues to be paid and no penalty of any kind is
imposed so long as the player complies with the terms of the prescribed
treatment.
NBA Release-Overview, supra note 155.
162. The relevant provision states:
Any player who, after previously requesting and receiving treatment for a
drug problem, again comes forward voluntarily to seek such treatment is suspended without pay during the period of such treatment but receives no further
penalty.
Id.

163. The overview states:
Any subsequent illegal use of drugs, even if voluntarily disclosed, results in
immediate permanent dismissal from the NBA.
Id.

164. In addition, "[T]he identity of the players [tested] remains confidential if the results are negative." Id.; see also supra note 155. NBA Release, The Independent Expert, NBA

Anti-Drug Program (undated) ("Players have undergone such testing in the last two years,
although their identities remain confidential") [hereinafter NBA Release].
165. See supra note 155. The NBA Release-Overview states:
A critical part of the Agreement is the appointment of an independent expert ...whose job it is to decide whether information made available to the
NBA or the Players Association constitutes reasonable cause to believe that a
player may have engaged in the illegal use of drugs. If so, he may issue an
authorization for testing which gives the NBA permission to administer tests for
drug usage four times during a six-week period, such times to be decided at the
discretion of the NBA without the prior knowledge of the player . . ..
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club or league officials.' 66 Consequently, NBA players are afforded

another level of protection from intrusion. The penalty for the first
positive result on an involuntary test is draconian, namely, permanent dismissal from the league;
however, players may appeal for re67
instatement after two years.1
Thus far, four players, John Drew, Michael Ray Richardson,
Mitchell Wiggins, and Lewis Lloyd, have received such "lifetime"
bans, all for cocaine use." 8 In May 1987, Richardson unsuccessfully
sought reinstatement less than two years after his February 1986

dismissal. e1 He contended that his case merited special consideration because his treating psychiatrist had once sent him
out to buy
170
cocaine, resulting in the resurrection of his addiction.
G.

The National Hockey League

The National Hockey League (NHL) has no official written
drug testing program, nor does it have an official list of sanctions for
drug use. The League's "program" is embodied in two orders by
John A. Ziegler, Jr., President of the NHL, dated July 24, 1978 and
January 3, 1979, concerning drug use by Donald W. Murdoch, then

a player for the New York Rangers.' 7
On April 24, 1978, Murdoch pled guilty to possession of cocaine
in the Provincial Court in Ontario. 7 2 Murdoch admitted that he had
had cocaine in his possession, but denied that it was for his use.
Maintaining that he received it by accident, Murdoch stated that he
had intended to throw it away but forgot and that it had been placed
in his baggage by someone else.' 73 Ziegler noted in his order of July
24, 1978 that Murdoch's claims had been corroborated and accepted
Id. See also NBA Release, supra note 164.
166. NBA Release-Overview, supra note 155.
167. Id. See also supra note 158 and accompanying text.
168. Asher, 3 Suns Players Are Indicted In Drug Probe, Washington Post, April 18,
1987, at DI, col. 5; Richardson Given Release, Wilmington News-Journal, June 15, 1987, at
C6; Missanelli, Richardson is Working for Another NBA Shot, Philadelphia Inquirer, May
20, 1987, at IF.
169. Compare Goodwin, NBA Will Hear Richardson Plea, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1987,
at A25, col. 5 (reinstatement meeting scheduled for next day between NBA and Richardson's
attorney), with Michael Ray Working Way Back to NBA, USA Today, June 26, 1987, at Cl,
col. 4 (Richardson waiting until February 1988 to apply for reinstatement).
170. Goodwin, supra note 169.
171. Ziegler, Re: NHL Player Donald Walter Murdoch, (July 24, 1978) (Order and
decision) [hereinafter Ziegler Order 1]; Ziegler, Re: NHL Player Walter Murdoch, (January
3, 1979) (Order and decision) [hereinafter Ziegler Order II]; see also Casey, News Release,
(July 24, 1978) [hereinafter NHL News Release].
172. Ziegler Order 1, supra note 171, at I; NHL News Release, supra note 171, at 1.
173. Ziegler Order 1, supra note 171, at 1; NHL News Release, supra note 171, at 1-2.
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them as true.1"' Nonetheless, Ziegler found Murdoch's conduct "dishonorable, prejudicial to and/or against the welfare of the National
Hockey League and/or the game of Hockey.'

75

Ziegler thus imposed on Murdoch a $500.00 fine and a one season suspension, subject to commutation after forty games upon written request by the Rangers and good conduct by Murdoch. 7 6 Ziegler permitted Murdoch, at his club's discretion, to participate in
training and practice sessions to maintain his fitness and hockey
77

skills.1
On December 28, 1978, the New York Rangers made a-written
request that Murdoch's suspension be commuted to forty games. 1 78
Based on a meeting with Murdoch, his agent, and Rangers coach

Fred Shero, and "other such information" that he deemed relevant,
Ziegler granted the Rangers' request.17 9 In both orders, Ziegler used
language that appears to be a statement of policy.' 80 For instance, in
his second order, he wrote:
It must be emphasized that this commutation should not be interpreted to indicate any change in the policy of the NHL as set
forth in my Order of July 24, 1978. If a player in the NHL
wishes to use illegal drugs and if this is discovered, he will lose
his privilege of playing in the NHL.'8'

Ziegler's first order, however, took into account many factual
aspects of Murdoch's case. 82 Consequently, the orders in Murdoch's
174.
175.
176.

Ziegler Order I, supra note 171, at 1;NHL News Release, supra note 171, at 2.
Ziegler Order I, supra note 171, at 1.
In his suspending order Ziegler wrote:
I also impose on player Donald W. Murdoch a suspension of all NHL exhibition, regular season and play-off games for the 1978-79 season with the stipulation and provision that said suspension shall be commuted to all exhibition and
the first 40 regular season NHL games, provided:
(1)The League shall receive from the New York Rangers a written
request not earlier than their 30th regular season game and not later than
their 35th regular season game requesting that such suspension be so
commuted.
(2) Mr. Murdoch does not act or conduct himself between this date
and the time of reinstatement in such a manner so as to bring dishonor to
or prejudice to or against the welfare of the National Hockey League.
Ziegler Order 1,supra note 171, at 1-2.
177. Id. at 2. However, Ziegler prohibited Murdoch from participating in exhibition or
regular season NHL games, or intra-squad games where the public was invited to attend. Id.
178. Ziegler Order II, supra note 171.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.; see also Ziegler Order 1, supra note 171, at 2-3. See also infra note 183 and
accompanying text.
182. Ziegler Order i, supra note 171. For instance, in that order, Ziegler stated:
My decision to commute the suspension to 40 games is based upon the pres-
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case did not establish per se rules of policy. Rather, they indicate
that the parameters of future sanctions for drug use will be determined on a case-by-case basis by the Commissioner, at least as to
commutation. On the other hand, Ziegler's suspending order appears
to set general guidelines for treatment of future cases. For example,
it states:
Every player in the NHL enjoys very special privileges
With these privileges, however, comes a corresponding burden of responsibility. As the benefits are received at an early
age, so too does responsibility come to rest upon our young men.
This responsibility must include the obligation to avoid criminal
conduct. It especially includes the obligation to have no contact
with illegal drugs.
There is no need to recite how serious the matter of drugs is
in our society today. Suffice it that contact with illegal drugs has
no place in the National Hockey League. Any player presently
in the NHL or who may hereafter join the NHL must face the
fact that if he wishes to be involved in illegal drugs then he will,
if discovered, lose his privilege of playing in the NHL.188
Read together, Ziegler's orders in the Murdoch matter appear
to establish a policy of suspension or permanent expulsion from the
NHL with the period and terms of the player's absence from competition being decided on a case-by-case basis. They also appear to establish that conditions of return will be determined on a case-by-case
basis depending not only upon the Commissioner's opinion of the degree to which the player's conduct harmed the NHL, but also vari184
ous other factual considerations.
entation made by Mr. Murdoch, his agent, his attorney and Rangers' management. I was persuaded that this misconduct and poor judgment was in good part
a matter of immaturity. Because of Mr. Murdoch's age and inexperience, I have
decided that if he wishes not to lose a full year of participation, he may by his
own good conduct persuade me and his present team to endorse his return at the
expiration of 40 games.
183. Id. at 2-3. Ziegler further noted:
[Murdoch] has been endowed with exceptional athletic skills which have
enabled him to participate at the highest level of the sport. His dedication plus
his skill permits him to earn an income that on the average places him in the
upper 5%of all income earners in North America. He is idolized by young and
old alike. He benefits from the privileges of fame.
Id.; see also infra note 184 and accompanying text.
184. An examination of the provision under which Ziegler suspended Murdoch supports
these conclusions. The provision is integrity-based, and states, in pertinent part:
If, in the opinion of the [Commissioner], based upon such information and
reports as he may deem sufficient, any act or the conduct of any official of a
Member Club or player or employee whether during or outside the playing sea-
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H. Amateur Sports-The NCAA's Program"'

1. Introduction.-In January 1986, the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) enacted a drug testing program that
became effective August 1, 1986.186 Since its enactment, the program has been awash in controversy. By January 1987, thirty-two

NCAA football players had tested positive for banned substances, as
had two and one-half percent of all NCAA autumn sport athletes. 8
Though no basketball players tested positive under the program during the men's 1987 NCAA basketball tournament, complaints prolif-

erated about the general idea of testing and the way it was implemented during that tournament.'88 The program had, however,
son, has been dishonorable, prejudicial to or against the welfare of the League or
the game of hockey, he may expel of suspend such person or impose on such a
person and/or Member Club a fine not exceeding Ten Thousand Dollars
($10,000) in the case of an official of a Member Club, or Five Hundred Dollars
($500) in the case of a player or employee, or he may order and impose both a
suspension and a fine.
NHL By-Laws, § 17.3(a).
185. This Article will not examine drug testing programs implemented by amateur athletic organizations other than the NCAA, such as the Amateur Athletic Association or the
United States Olympic Committee. For a discussion of the drug testing programs implemented
at the ninth Pan American Games in Caracas in 1983, the Pan American Games in Indianapolis in the summer of 1987, and the Olympics, see Janofsky, Games' Drug Tests: No Simple
System, N.Y. Times, August 12, 1987, at B9, col. 1.
186. Release, The NCAA Drug-Testing Program 1986-87, (August 1986) [hereinafter
NCAA Brochure].
187. Parillo, How Testing Will Work in the NCAA Tourney, Philadelphia Inquirer,
March 10, 1987, at l-D, col. 1; Neff, Bosworth Faces The Music, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, January 5, 1987, at 21; see also id., front cover, stating "Brian Bosworth and 20 Others Fail Their
NCAA Drug Tests." The most celebrated cases were those of Oklahoma's Brian Bosworth and
Roland Barbay of Louisiana State. Bosworth was declared ineligible for the Orange Bowl.
Barbay was forced to sit out the Sugar Bowl but only after a lawsuit on his behalf failed.
Barbay v. NCAA, C.A. No. 86-5697 (E.D. La., Jan. 29, 1987).
188. Some complained that postgame testing caused delays due to player dehydration.
However, pregame testing was rejected as an "invasion of game preparation." Patrick, NCAA
Drug-Testing: Hot Topic. No Changes, USA Today, March 17, 1987, at IC, col. 4. Others
complained that the program does not assure a clean tournament because only players on
winning teams are tested, and that postgame testing permits players later declared ineligible to
compete in the first round. Dolson, NCAA Tourney Drug-Testing Program Doesn't Add Up,
Philadelphia Inquirer, March 10, 1987, at I-F, col. 1. One complaint was that the operation of
the program "might suggest that the organization is more interested in improving its image
than doing what's right." Newman, Chaney Not Happy with Drug Testing, Philadelphia Inquirer, March 14, 1987, at I-D, col. 6. According to Temple University Coach John Chaney,
the program unjustifiably thrusts athletes into the spotlight because the drug problem is a
societal one. Id. Chaney was also unhappy with the fact that testing only players on winning
teams allows players on losing teams to go untested. Id. See also Other Schools Criticize How
Drug Tests Given, Philadelphia Inquirer, March 14, 1987, at I-D, col. 5 (postgame testing
"takes away much of the excitement of victory;" Duke coach favors pregame testing; Bobby
Knight favors pre-tournament testing; two players too dehydrated to give urine samples; other
players able to produce samples only after two-hour wait); Parillo, How Drug Testing Will
Work in the NCAA Tourney, Philadelphia Inquirer, March 10, 1987, at I-D, col. I (Program
unclear about marijuana; Temple's Associate Director of Athletics needed to call NCAA to
find out that sanction for marijuana use is a warning).
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garnered some support among those affected."8 9 The program covers
all NCAA sports,' but only postseason competition. 9 '
2. Authorization to Test.-The focal point of the program is a
consent provision which requires student-athletes to sign an annual
statement consenting to be tested for chemicals the NCAA prohibits. 9 2 Failure to complete and sign the statement annually results in

the student-athlete's ineligibility in all intercollegiate competition. 193
Revocation of consent also results in ineligibility. 9 ' The same is true
for students who refuse to provide urine or fail to appear when
95
scheduled for testing.'
3. Substance List.-The NCAA bans use of over three thousand substances.

96

The preface to the NCAA brochure states that

189. Parillo, How Drug Testing Will Work in the NCAA Tourney, Philadelphia Inquirer, March 10, 1987, I-D, col. I (Temple Associate Athletic Director opined: "[Y]ou'll get
some people who will say it's a violation of civil rights. But I think it's really important to
protect the health and welfare of the student-athlete, and I also think it's important to have
fair competition. And I think this is what the NCAA is trying to do."). Id.
190. See supra note 186. The release contains no explicit listing of the sports to which it
applies, hence the conclusion that it ostensibly applies to all NCAA intercollegiate sports.
191. The penalty provisions of the Program apply only to "preparation for or participation in an NCAA championship or certified postseason football contest." NCAA Brochure,
supra note 186, at 203. In addition, the provision of the release outlining the coverage of the
program states:
Section 7. Drugs. (a) The Executive Committee shall authorize methods for
drug testing of student-athletes who compete in NCAA championships and certified post season football contests . . . . The Executive Committee shall determine those championships and certified postseason football contests for which
drugs shall be made and the procedures to be followed in disclosing its
determinations.
Id. at 3. From the brochure's "NCAA championship and certified post season football contests" language flows the conclusion that the NCAA's program covers only postseason competition. The NCAA does not sponsor an official Division I championship in football.
192. This provision states:
The student-athlete shall annually, prior to participation in intercollegiate
competition during the academic year in question, sign a statement in a form
prescribed by the NCAA Council in which the student athlete . . . consents to
be tested for the use of drugs prohibited by NCAA legislation. Failure to complete and sign the statement annually shall result in the student-athlete's ineligibility for participation in all intercollegiate competition.
NCAA Brochure, supra note 186, at 2.
193. Id. The program also contains provisions requiring student-athletes who have been
tested to sign a form certifying that there were no irregularities in the testing process, and that
"[flailure to sign without justification is cause for the same action(s) as evidence of use of a
banned substance." Id. at 15.
194. The brochure states that if a student-athlete signs the annual consent statement but
subsequently refuses to be tested when scheduled to be tested, "[tihe student athlete will be
considered to have withdrawn his or her consent, thereby rendering himself or herself ineligible." Id. at 15.
195. Id.
196. See NCAA brochure, supra note 186, at 9-10; Parillo, supra note 188; Levant and
Hill v. NCAA, No. 619209 (Cal. Super., Santa Clara County, March 13, 1987) (order grant-
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the list of banned substances "is comprised of drugs generally purported to be performance enhancing and/or potentially harmful to
the health and safety of the student-athlete." '9 7 The list specifically
includes psychomotor stimulants (such as amphetamines and cocaine) and anabolic steroids, as well as other drugs. Alcohol is
banned for specific sports, testosterone is banned if its ratio in the
bloodstream to epitestosterone exceeds a certain figure, caffeine is
banned if the concentration in urine exceeds 15 micrograms/ml,
heroin and methamphetamine are banned, and marijuana and THC
(tetrahydrocannabinol) are banned "based on a repeat testing."198
However, the sanction for the first positive test for marijuana is only
a warning.' 9 9 The use of cortiscosteroids must be declared and accompanied by a doctor's written statement of the competitor's name,
dose, and reason and date of treatment. 0
4. Prescription Exception.-Inevitably, the ban covers many
prescription and over-the-counter medicines.2 0 ' The program permits
use, without penalty, of a limited number of such substances through
a prescription exception. 2 The exception applies only to substances
in the NCAA's categories of "substances banned for specific sports"
and "diuretics. ' 20 3 The exception does not apply to psychomotor
stimulants, nervous system stimulants, or anabolic steroids.2 ' The
athlete must establish "a documented medical history demonstrating
the need for regular use of such a drug."20 5
5. Selection Method.-The NCAA brochure does not itself
completely specify the method by which athletes will be selected for
testing. Instead, "[t]he method for selecting student-athletes will be
recommended by the NCAA drug testing committee, approved by
the Executive Committee, and implemented by the NCAA staff
ing preliminary injunction, slip op., at 2) [hereinafter Levant Order]; Levant and Hill v.
NCAA, (Cal. Super., Santa Clara County, March 11, 1987) (hearing on motion order-reporter's transcript of proceedings at 2) [hereinafter Levant transcript].
197. NCAA brochure, supra note 186, at 1.
198. Id. at 1, 9, 10.
199. Parillo, How Drug Testing Will Work in the NCAA Tourney, Philadelphia Inquirer, March 10, 1987, at l-D, col. 1. Confirmed evidence of blood doping is also grounds for
possible punitive action. NCAA Brochure, supra note 186, at 10.
200. NCAA Brochure, supra note 186, at 10.
201. See University of Washington, Interdepartmental Correspondence, Memorandum
PB-10from Morris to Gerberding, August 13, 1986, at 203 [hereinafter Morris Memo].
202. NCAA Brochure, supra note 186, at 3, 4, 9.
203. Id. Alcohol is listed as a substance banned for specific sports. Id. at 9.
204. Id. at 3, 4, 9.
205. Id. at 3.
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. . . .All student-athletes in the event are subject to testing.""" The
brochure further provides that "[a]t NCAA individual/team championship events, selection of athletes may be based on random draw,
position or suspicion . . . .All student-athletes participating in the
event are subject to testing."2 ' With regard to team championships
and certified bowl games, the brochure provides:
Student-athletes may be selected on the basis of playing
time, positions and/or an NCAA approved random selection.
The selection will be determined prior to or during the competition. During the competition includes up to one hour following
the conclusion of an individual's last participation on any particular day.2"'
6. Penalties.-The NCAA program contains three levels of
penalties for findings of drug use or positive tests results. First, student-athletes who are "found to have utilized . . . a substance on the
[NCAA's] list of banned drugs" become ineligible for further partic-

ipation in that year's postseason competition." 9 Subject to certain
conditions, the student-athlete's university may appeal that
sanction. 10
Second, student-athletes who test positive become ineligible for
postseason competition for a minimum of ninety (90) days after the
test date.2 11 Third, student-athletes who lose their eligibility, regain
it, and then test positive, lose one season of postseason eligibility in
all sports.2 12 They also are ineligible for postseason competition at
206.

NCAA Brochure, supra note 186, at 13.

207.

Id.

208. Id. Interestingly, an attachment provided by the University of Washington to the
Morris Memo, cited supra note 201, entitled Student-Athlete Briefing on Drug Testing, and
also dated August 13, 1987, which seeks to outline the NCAA program for University of
Washington student-athletes, states: "In effect, the NCAA may use any selection method it
chooses." Attachment, Student-Athlete Briefing on Drug Testing, at 2.
209. NCAA Brochure, supra note 186, at 2.
210. The relevant portion of the NCAA release states:
A student-athlete who is found to have utilized (in preparation for or participation in an NCAA championship or certified postseason football contest) a
substance on the list of banned drugs . . . shall not be eligible for further participation in postseason competition. Subject to [certain conditions,] the certifying
institution may appeal to the Eligibility Committee for restoration of the student-athlete's eligibility if the institution concludes that circumstances warrant
restoration.
id.
211. The brochure states:
A student-athlete who "tests positive" ... shall remain ineligible for postseason competition for a minimum of 90 days after the test date.

Id.
212.

NCAA Brochure, supra note 186, at 3.
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least through the succeeding academic year.213 Any person who tests
positive at one championship is automatically tested at the next
championship at which he or she appears.2 14
7. Confidentiality.-The NCAA program, in a "Buckley
Amendment Consent, ' 21 5 limits the disclosure of test results. Unless
the testee consents, positive results are disclosed only to authorized
representatives of the NCAA, of the testee's institution, and of that
institution's athletic conference, if any, and only for the purpose of
determining the testee's eligibility for intercollegiate athletics, recruitment by an NCAA institution, and eligibility for athletically related financial aid.21 6 No provision allows disclosure of negative results, even to the testee. Instead, NCAA institutions and studentathletes are to assume that results are negative if they have not
heard from the NCAA within thirty days after the specimen was
provided.21 7
Positive results are first linked to specific individuals by the

NCAA director of research and sports sciences or "her designate,"
who breaks a numerical code to identify individuals with positive
findings.21 8 The NCAA must send that information to the chief executive officer and director of athletics at those student-athletes' in-

stitutions.21 9 It is the institution's responsibility to inform the stu213. Id.
214. Id.at 13. The brochure also provides that student-athletes found to be positive for
a banned substance are subject to additional "disciplinary action(s) consistent with existing
policies." Id. at 12.
215. Id. at 9.
216. Id. Other disclosure provisions of the NCAA brochure state:
7.1.3 By telephone, the laboratory will inform the NCAA of the results of each
respective code number. Subsequently, the laboratory will mail to the NCAA
director of research and sports sciences the original manifest with the respective
finding recorded for each code 7.2 Upon receipt of the original manifest and
the laboratory findings, the NCAA director of research and sports sciences or
her designate will break the number code to identify individuals with positive
findings.
7.4 The NCAA will notify the institution's chief executive officer and director of athletics of the findings. It is the institution's responsibility to inform
the student-athlete.
Id. at 16-17.
217. The relevant provision states, "If the member institution has not heard from the
NCAA within 30 days after the specimen was provided, the test results will be assumed to be
negative." Id. at 16. With respect to negative results, the program does not authorize breaking
of the student-athlete's numerical code. Id. Regarding numerical codes for positive tests, see
supra note 216 and accompanying text.
218. Id.
219. The brochure states: "For student-athletes who have a positive finding, that information will be sent by the NCAA to the chief executive officer and the director of athletics
immediately by 'overnight/signature required' letter. Concurrently, the student-athlete's director of athletics will be contacted by telephone if possible ... ."Id.
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dent-athlete.220
8. Challenges.-The program has been the subject of two legal challenges. It was upheld against the injury to reputation and
defamation claims of one football player who was found to have used
steroids. 2 1 However, an injunction issued in reliance upon the California Constitution declared the NCAA's consent provisions temporarily unenforceable against a Stanford University diver.222
Also, in a case in which the NCAA was not originally a party, a
Superior Court of the State of Washington concluded that the
NCAA's consent provision violated that state's constitution.22 The
primary discussion of these cases takes place in Section III of this
Article.
I.

University of Washington

The NCAA's brochure contains suggested guidelines for NCAA
institutions contemplating the implementation of their own drug testing programs. Approximately 100 of the NCAA's 284 division I
schools have enacted such programs.225 In a pamphlet dated February 6, 1987, the University of Washington announced its own drug
testing policy covering student-atnletes engaged in intercollegiate
athletics.226
1. Substance List.-The program contemplated testing for
seven types of substances. They are:
a) Amphetamines (stimulants)
b) Barbiturates (depressants)
c) Cannabinoids (the active principles of marijuana and
hashish)
220. Id. at 16-17.
221. Barbay v. NCAA and Louisiana State University, C.A. No. 86-5697 (E.D. La.,
Jan. 20, 1987).
222. Levant Order, supra note 196; infra notes 284-95 and accompanying text; Levant
transcript, supra note 196; infra notes 284-95 and accompanying text.
223. O'Halloran & Burch v. University of Washington, No. 87-2-08775-1 (Wash.
Super, King County, July 23, 1987) (transcript of oral opinion) [hereinafter O'Halloran
transcript].
224. NCAA Brochure, supra note 186, at 19-20.
225. Parillo, supra note 188. The program of Temple University, for instance, calls for
random testing of student-athletes for three drugs-anabolic steroids, cocaine, and amphetamines. Id. Legal challenges have been instituted against the programs of at least three universities - the University of Washington, the University of Colorado, and Northeastern University. See Lederman, California Judge Hears Arguments in Challenge to NCAA Drug-Test

Program, CHRON.

HIGH. EDUC.,

Al, A43 (Oct. 21, 1987).

226. Pamphlet, University of Washington Mandatory and Voluntary Drug Education
and Testing Programfor Student Athletes (Feb. 6, 1987) [hereinafter Wash. pamphlet].
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d) Cocaine (strongly addictive)
e) Methaqualone (depressant)
f) Opiates (strongly addictive agents, including heroin and

morphine)
g) Phencyclidine (hallucinogen). 2 7
2.

Authorization to Test

a. Mandatory Testing.-The program authorized three types
of testing-mandatory testing, voluntary testing, and reasonable sus-

picion testing.228 Under the mandatory portion, each student-athlete,
male or female, would be tested for prohibited substances as part of
his or her annual medical examination.229 No individualized suspicion would be required.2 30
b. Voluntary Testing.-The voluntary phase of the program
allows student-athletes to volunteer for additional tests. 2"' Those who

choose to participate in the university's voluntary testing program
sign a consent form that is quite similar to the consent form signed
as part of the mandatory program.23 2 By participating in the voluntary phase, student-athletes volunteer for more of the identical type
of test already mandated by the program once a year.233
c. Reasonable Suspicion Testing.-The reasonable suspicion

phase of the program operates independently of the other two. It
authorizes coaches, "based on a reasonable suspicion that a student
athlete is taking drugs improperly, and that testing will confirm such
.. . to refer him or her for a medical evaluation at any time," subject to the student-athlete's right to contest whether a reasonable
suspicion exists. 23 ' As a result of the medical evaluation, the student227. Id. at I. Offensive and defensive linemen and linebackers in football, members of
the varsity crew, and throwers in track and field were to be tested also for anabolic steroids.
Id.
228. id. at 1, 3.
229. Id. at I.
230. Id.
231. See id. at 1; infra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
232. Compare Wash. pamphlet, supra note 226, at parts Ill and IV.
233. Wash. pamphlet, supra note 226, at 1. As the program makes clear: "The voluntary phase of the testing program, for which a student-athlete may volunteer at any time, will
encompass the same drugs and observe the same operating procedures as its mandatory
phase."
234. Id. at 3 (emphasis in original). The program also requires a head coach who "reasonably suspects, prior to any drug testing of a student-athlete, that a medical evaluation and
drug test of a certain student athlete will produce evidence of improper drug use" to "notify
the student-athlete of his or her suspicion and present the student-athlete with the evidence
supporting the suspicion." Id. at 9.
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athlete may be required to submit to testing for drugs covered by the
program. 35 "Reasonable suspicion" is defined as a suspicion that is
"founded on specific, objective facts which, taken with rational inferences drawn from those facts, indicate that a medical evaluation and
possible testing will produce evidence of improper drug use. '2 36 Also,

the evidence supporting the suspicion "must be reasonably reliable,
documented, and clearly presented. ' ' 237
3.

Consent Form and Penalties for Non-Consent.-The pro-

gram requires each student-athlete to sign a form consenting to be
tested under either the mandatory or voluntary phase of the pro-

gram. 38 Refusal to be tested under the mandatory program results

in ineligibility to participate in intercollegiate athletics on behalf of

the university. " 9
Subsequent to providing urine specimens, athletes must also
sign test certification forms indicating that no irregularities occurred
during the collection process or describing any irregularities that did
occur. 24 0 Refusal to sign such a form results in notification to the
team physician, and possible notification to the appeals committee,
for "consideration and appropriate action. 24 1
Refusal to provide a urine sample or failure to appear for testing results in ineligibility to participate in intercollegiate athletics on
behalf of the university. 2 However, such a refusal is subject to the
athlete's right to appeal.2 "'
4.

Penalties for Positive Tests.-The program provides for a

As to appeals concerning the existence of a reasonable suspicion, the student athlete is
entitled to a meeting with the head coach within 24 hours, at which time the student-athlete
may respond to the evidence and explain his or her position. Id. Within 24 hours after that
meeting, the head coach will meet with one member of the appeals committee. Id. The student
athlete is entitled to attend this meeting. Id. If the member of the appeals committee finds that
a reasonable suspicion exists, the student-athlete may appeal the finding of the committee
member to the full appeals committee, but an appeal does not relieve the student-athlete of the
obligation to undergo a medical evaluation or produce a urine sample. Id. Instead, if the student-athlete appeals, the urine sample produced is stored frozen and untested until the full
committee renders a decision on whether a reasonable suspicion existed. Id. This freezing procedure seems unorthodox. If the program withstands judicial scrutiny, a better appeal procedure should be implemented.
235. Id. at 3.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 2.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 5.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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graded series of penalties for positive tests.2" The first positive test
results in spot testing on a regular basis; counseling and treatment
are also prescribed."" Neither the athletic director nor the head
coach is informed of first positive tests, and the student-athlete may
be tested again within four weeks.2 "
A second positive test results in suspension from participation in
the intercollegiate athletics program for seven days.2 417 The studentathlete is required to meet with the head coach and team physician
and to enter a counseling and treatment program, and the athlete
may be tested again within four weeks.2" 8 A third positive test results in suspension from the intercollegiate athletics program for a
minimum of four weeks. 249 The treatment and counseling requirements remain in effect, and the student-athlete may be tested again
within four weeks.260
A fourth positive test results in indefinite suspension from participation in the intercollegiate athletics program.25 1 The student
athlete may petition for reinstatement upon three conditions. 2 2 The
athlete must a) authorize team physicians to review records of the
athlete's counseling or other treatment during the period of suspension, b) consent to a comprehensive medical examination, including
drug testing, and c) agree to undergo unannounced, periodic drug
testing until the athlete has had three consecutive negative drug
tests. 253 The treatment and counseling requirements remain in effect.2" 4 A fifth positive test results in immediate and permanent banning from further participation in the University's intercollegiate
athletics program. 5
5. Confidentiality.-The program strictly limits disclosure of
results and makes clear that results may be released only as authorized by the program or required by law. 6 If an athlete under eighteen years of age tests positive, the results are disclosed to the ath244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
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lete's parent(s) or guardian(s). 5 7 In addition, the appropriate head
coach and the athletic director "will be informed of the results of
any test conducted because the head coach reasonably suspected that
the test would produce evidence of improper drug use."268 Otherwise,

neither the athletic director nor the head coach is informed of the
first positive results.2"9 Subsequently, the team physician notifies the
appropriate head coach and the athletic director of any student-athlete's second positive test and any subsequent positive or negative
results.2 60 The team physician also notifies the student-athlete of any
261
positive results.
6. Invalidity.-In O'Halloran v. University of Washington,262
this program was held to violate both the fourth amendment and the
Constitution of the state of Washington. The case will be discussed
more fully in section III of this Article.
III.

Challenges

Thus far, challenges have been instituted, on various grounds, to
the enforceability of five of the seven programs discussed above.263
Only one program, the New Jersey Horse Racing program, has fully
withstood the challenge made against it. 64 This Article will discuss
the challenges which have been made to those five programs, the
grounds upon which those challenges were based, the rationales underlying the results, and the implications of the resolutions of those
challenges concerning the likely future validity of sports-related drug
testing programs.
A.

Privacy Claims

1. Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Law - Shoemaker (Part ]).-Thus far one challenge to a sports-related drug
testing program has relied on fourth amendment search and seizure
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 2.
260. Id. at 8.
261. Id. The bodies before which the student-athletes contest positive findings are informed of such findings. Id. at 8-9.
262. O'Halloran v. University of Washington, No. 87-2-08775-1 (Wash. Super., King
County, July 23, 1987) (Transcript of oral opinion) [hereinafter O'Halloran transcript].
263. Challenges have been brought against New Jersey's Horse Racing program, and
the programs of the NCAA, the University of Washington, Major League Baseball, and Professional Football.
264. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577
(1986).
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law2"' without simultaneous reliance on a state constitution. In Shoemaker v. Handel,266 a group of professional jockeys claimed that the

New Jersey Racing Commission Program violated their fourth
amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and

seizures.267 More specifically, the jockeys argued that the regulations
unreasonably required them to submit to random urinalysis and
breathalyzer tests with no requirement of individualized suspicion.26 8
Before the Third Circuit, the Commission did not argue that the

tests involved no fourth amendment search or seizure. 269 Nevertheless, the court held that the program did not violate the fourth
amendment.2 7
The court found that the warrantless testing contemplated by
the program was permissible under the administrative exception to
the fourth amendment's general warrant requirement. 27 1 The court
noted that application of the administrative search exception has two
requirements. 2 First, "a strong state interest in conducting an
unannounced search," and, second, a reduced expectation of privacy
for the subject of the search such as would be created by pervasive
regulation of the industry. 7 The court reasoned that New Jersey
had a strong interest in conducting unannounced testing "assuring
the public of the integrity of persons engaged in the horse racing
industry. '' 27 4 The court concluded that the second requirement of the
265. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577
(1986). The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
In O'Halloran, supra note 262, the court relied on both the fourth amendment and the
state constitution. See also infra note 324 and accompanying text. In Levant, the plaintiff did
not rely on the fourth amendment. First Amended Complaint For Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief and Damages, Levant v. NCAA, No. 616209 [hereinafter Levant Complaint].
266. For the lower court decisions, see Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.
N.J. 1985); Shoemaker v. Handel, 608 F. Supp. 1151 (D. N.J. 1985).
267. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1137 (3d Cir. 1986).
268. Id. at 1141.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1143.
271. Id. at 1142-43.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1142.
274. Id. The court unequivocally emphasized its recognition of a strong state integrity
interest by its language. The court stated:
Frequent alcoholic and drug testing is an effective means of demonstrating
that persons engaged in the horse racing industry are not subject to certain
outside influences. It is the public's perception, not the known suspicion, that
triggers the state's strong interest in conducting warrantless testing.
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administrative exception was satisfied by the combination of two fac-

tors-a) historically intense regulation of the industry and b) the
jockeys' voluntary participation in that industry. 75
Having concluded that the administrative search exception applied, the court turned to the question of whether the discretion of

the New Jersey Racing Commission was sufficiently circumscribed. 276 The court noted that the breathalyzer regulation had been
implemented in such a way that all jockeys were required to submit
to a warrantless breathalyzer test on each racing day.277 Thus, as
implemented, the breathalyzer program was mandatory, not random.217 8 Hence, the court concluded, it was permissible under the
fourth amendment as implemented because "as this program has

been implemented there is no room for standardless discretion. 2 79
The court expressly left open the issue of whether the breathalyzer
program would be permissible under the fourth amendment if implemented differently.2 80
The urinalysis program was implemented differently. Though
all jockeys were "at risk" of being tested each day, not all were
tested every day.2 81 Instead, a random selection method was used,
with choices made by daily lottery.2 82 The court found that because
choices were dictated by lottery the State Steward had no discretion
in conducting the tests and, hence, they were permitted by the fourth

amendment."

3

id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1143.
277. Id. at 1143 n.6.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1143.
280. Id. at 1143 n.6.
281. Id. at 1143.
282. Id.
283. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1143. One commentator characterizes Shoemaker as the
*lone deviant" from a "general rule of legality" under the fourth amendment concerning drug
testing of employees by employers. Miller, Mandatory Urinalysis Testing And The Privacy
Rights Of Subject Employees: Toward A General Rule of Legality Under The Fourth
Amendment, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 201, 218 (1986). The commentator argues that Shoemaker is
inconsistent with other fourth amendment drug testing decisions because those decisions establish that "the desire to maintain the integrity and appearance of cleanliness in horse racing" is
insufficient "to justify the substantial intrusion that urinalysis entails," by establishing that no
public interest other than the public's safety is compelling enough to warrant "the severe intrusion urinalysis represents." Id. at 229-30. The commentator's rule is
No employer subject to the proscription of the fourth amendment may demand of an employee a urine specimen for a chemical analysis unless:
(1) that employee is in a position where the impairment of his or her faculties presents a clear and present danger to the physical safety of the employee,
another employee, or a member of the public, and
(2) that employer can point to specific objective facts and reasonable infer-
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2. The California Constitution - Levant v. NCAA.-A second privacy-based challenge to a sports-related drug testing program
was resolved solely under the privacy provision of the California

Constitution. The result of that case contrasts sharply with the result
in Shoemaker. In Levant v. NCAA, 284 the captain of the Stanford
University women's diving team challenged the NCAA's "consent"
provision, primarily under the privacy provision (article I, section 1)
of the California Constitution."a
Levant refused to sign the NCAA's consent provision.2 a6 Relying on the express right of privacy granted by the California Constitution, Judge Stone of the California Superior Court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the NCAA program
against Levant. 8 The preliminary injunction permitted Levant to
ences drawn from these facts in light of experience, which indicate that that
particular employee is, while in the position described in paragraph (I) above,
under the influence of alcoholic beverages or controlled substances.
Id. at 216-17.
284. Supra note 196.
285. Art. I, § I states "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among those are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1. Levant did not allege a
violation of the fourth amendment. Levant Complaint, supra note 265.
See also Judge Bars Drug Tests on Diver, Philadelphia Inquirer, March 12, 1987, at 9-3.
The attorney for the NCAA stated that the eventual grant of a preliminary injunction in
Levant "was based on the California Constitution and that it could not be applied to athletes
from other states." Id. See also Incident or Precedent?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, March 23,
1987, at 18.
Levant alleged, in addition to a violation of article 1, § I, violations of art. 1, § 7 (search
and seizure), and art. 1, § 13 (due process) of the California Constitution, invasion of privacy
due to intrusion into matters which she had a right and interest in keeping private, a claim of
procedural unfairness based on California common law, and negligent interference with economic relations. Levant Complaint, supra note 265, 11-18.
286. Levant Complaint, supra note 265, at 5; Incident Or Precedent?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, March 23, 1987, at 18; Ferber, Diver Just Says No, WOMEN'S SPORTS & FITNESS,
May 1987, at 25; Judge Bars Drug Tests on Diver, Philadelphia Inquirer, March 12, 1987, at
I-D.
287. Levant order, supra note 196, at 2; Levant transcript, supra note 196, at 3. In his
written order, Judge Stone enjoined the NCAA from:
a) Prohibiting plaintiff from competing in NCAA intercollegiate diving
competition;
b) Enforcing the testing procedures of the NCAA drug testing policy as to
plaintiff;
c) Requiring plaintiff to submit to any form of mandatory drug testing;
d) Conditioning the right to participate in intercollegiate diving competition
on submission to mandatory drug testing; and
e) Maintaining any files and records documenting the results of drug tests
and/or refusals to submit to same as to the plaintiff.
Levant order, supra note 196, at 3. Judge Stone also preliminarily enjoined the NCAA from
"prohibiting the plaintiff from competing in NCAA events or from interfering in any way with
plaintiff's participation in diving competition, and from taking any steps as against Stanford
University or other Stanford student athletes from treating plaintiff as an eligible athlete
under this order." Id. at 4.
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compete without penalty, both inside and outside of California,288
despite her refusal to sign the consent form.
Judge Stone termed the program "scientifically unsophisticated
and overbroad ' '2 89 and concluded that "[tihe tests do not precisely
relate to the effect of a particular substance on any athlete in any
particular competition."29 He concluded that the NCAA program
would not effectively accomplish the NCAA's stated goals, related
little to health or athletic performance, and was not narrowly tai-

lored to minimize intrusiveness. 91 Judge Stone did not articulate a
per se rule, stating instead in his oral decision that "testing for certain

. . .

substances under certain narrow circumstances [and] con-

ditions, may indeed pass constitutional muster."29 However, he concluded that "that is not what the Court is here presented with. 293
In reaching his decision, Judge Stone conceded that the goals of
the NCAA's program are laudable.

94

He rejected, as irrelevant or

simply unpersuasive, arguments concerning the program's popularity
and effectiveness, and the pervasiveness of NCAA regulations.29
288.
plaintiff in
289.
290.
291.

Judge Stone's written order states "This preliminary injunction applies to this
any NCAA competition no matter where it is held." Id.
Levant order, supra note 196, at 2; Levant transcript, supra note 196, at 2.
Levant order at 2; see also Levant transcript, supra note 196, at 2.
In his oral decision, Judge Stone stated:
The tests appear . . . not to accomplish the goals . . . set forth by the
NCAA in any particularly careful or well crafted manner.
There appears to be very little reasonable relationship to the performance or
the general health given the broad application of the three thousand substances
to all twenty-eight sports.
The least physically, emotionally, or constitutionally intrusive methods to
accomplish those laudable goals have barely been considered, much less proposed and implemented. The voluntariness of the athlete's efforts to compete
does not necessarily vitiate the reasonable expectation of privacy.
Levant transcript, supra note 196, at 2. See also Levant order, supra note 196, at 2.
292. Levant transcript, supra note 196, at 3.
293. Id.
294. Levant order, supra note 196, at 2; Levant transcript, supra note 196, at 2.
295. In his oral decision, Judge Stone stated:
I am not persuaded that because many organizations support this or similar
programs that it follows that it's okay. Perhaps many people would like to reinstitute slavery, but that doesn't make it constitutional.
The effectiveness of a particular institution, perhaps an abusive institution,
at a particular time of this kind of testing is not persuasive. Cutting off the
hands of a pickpocket in a crowd at some particular place doesn't make that,
although effective, constitutional.
It seems to the Court that honoring the constitution is the test. The Court
has no trouble with the fact that the NCAA regulations are pervasive, are manifold, and I think that's all laudable. But giving up the right to play poker for
money does not seem to me to equate with giving up the right to urinate in
private, the tests from which may reveal lifestyle, or other irrelevant but deeply
personal matters, such as the use of birth control medication.
Given this program, I do not believe that the defendant meets any of the
tests, whether the stringent compelling interest test, or the less stringent tests,
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The NCAA did not appeal the granting of the preliminary injunction. As to Levant, the matter became moot when the senior
diver failed to qualify for the NCAA postseason championships. 9 6
Levant is distinguishable from Shoemaker in three respects.
First, the NCAA's program is more intrusive than the program of
the New Jersey Racing Commission. It contemplates testing a
greater number of individuals for a greater number of substances.
A second possible distinction concerns the tester's interest in the
public's perception of his integrity. The New Jersey horse racing
program governed a professional sport, essentially a business whose
profits are affected by public perception. The NCAA program applies only to amateur sports. Its ostensible purpose is to benefit the
athletes, not itself. Perhaps the governing body of a professional
sport, having an overt economic self-interest in heightening and preserving fan interest, has a stronger legally cognizable interest in
maintaining public faith in the integrity of that sport's athletes.
The third and probably biggest distinction, however, is that
Shoemaker was decided under the fourth amendment while Levant
was decided under the privacy provision of the California Constitution. The California provision, unlike the fourth amendment, grants
individuals an explicit right of privacy, not merely one that is implicit or penumbral. 9
In Porten v. University of San Francisco,29 in construing article
I, section 1 of the state constitution, a California Court of Appeals
relied on an election brochure calling for an expansive reading of the
right of privacy under the California Constitution. The brochure
states: "The right of privacy is much more than 'unnecessary wordage.' It is fundamental to any free society. Privacy is not now guaranteed by our State Constitution. This simple amendment will extend various court decisions on privacy to ensure protection of our
basic rights."2 99 The Porten decision suggests that the privacy provieven the minimum. The balancing test, probable cause, reasonable suspicion,
none of that appears here.
Levant transcript, supra note 196, at 3-4; see also Levant order, supra note 196, at 2-3.
As to the interest in urinating in private, a method of drug testing has been developed in which
testing is performed on testees' hair. This method does not require a urine sample. Wessel,
Hair as History: Advantages Seen In New Methods For Drug Testing, Wall Street Journal,
May 22, 1987, at 21, col. 4. Also, not all judges agree that observed urination implicates a
significant privacy interest. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 808 F.2d
1057, 1061 (5th Cir. 1987) (Higginbotham, J., specially concurring).
296. See Incident or Precedent? supra note 286, at 18.
297. Compare note 265 with note 285.
298. 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 829, 134 Cal. Rptr. 938, 842 (1976).
299. Id.
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sion in the California Constitution will be construed as granting privacy rights more extensive than the fourth amendment's implicit privacy rights.
In one respect the privacy rights flowing from the California
Constitution have clearly been construed to be more extensive.
Porten construed the California Constitution as affording protection
against private individuals by granting "an inalienable right which
may not be violated by anyone.

3 00

The fourth and fourteenth

amendments and 42 U.S.C. section 1983 grant protection only
against governmental action.3" 1
3. The Fourth Amendment and Constitution of the State of
Washington Combined - O'Halloran v. University of Washington.-A third privacy challenge to a sport-related drug testing program was brought under both the fourth amendment and the Constitution of the State of Washington. In O'Halloran v. University of
0 2 a student at the
Washington,"
University of Washington chal-

lenged, under both the fourth amendment and article I, section 7 of
the Washington Constitution,30 3 the drug testing program of the
University of Washington.304 The program, if successfully implemented, would require about 800 athletes in 19 sports to undergo
testing in their annual medical examinations. 0 The suit was similar
to Levant in that article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution,
like the privacy provision of the California Constitution, has been
construed to be broader than the fourth amendment. 30
300. Id.
301. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (fourth amendment);
Barbay v. NCAA, C.A. No. 86-5697 (E.D. La., January 20, 1987) (Section 1983 requires
state action); Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (fourteenth amendment and
Section 1983); compare Levant, supra note 196, (no state action required for NCAA violation
of California Constitution), with Barbay (state action required for NCAA violation of Section
1983).
302. O'Halloran transcript, supra note 262.
303. Article I, § 7 provides:
Invasion of Private Affairs or Home Prohibited.
No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded,
without authority of law.
WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
304. See supra notes 226-32 and accompanying text.
305. Klass, Lawsuit Threatened to Block Drug Tests, Wilmington News-Journal, May
21, 1987, at E2, col. 5.
306. State v. Myrick, 102 Wash.2d 506, 688 P.2d 151, (1984); see also State v. Butterworth, No. 17108-9-1 (Wash. App., June 8, 1987). In State v. Butterworth, the court noted
that the language of the California Constitution (before being amended to incorporate an express right of privacy) closely tracked the fourth amendment, whereas the language of art. I, §
7 of the Washington Constitution was "much broader," and hence "it is much clearer in the
case of Const. art. 1,§ 7 . . .that an interpretation which extends broader rights than does
the fourth Amendment is appropriate." Butterworth, slip op. at -.
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On July 23, 1987, King County Superior Court Judge Mattson
of Washington, addressing cross motions for summary judgment, issued an oral ruling enjoining the University of Washington from implementing its policy against O'Halloran. 0 7 In his oral ruling, Judge
Mattson addressed two preliminary concerns. First, he voiced uncertainty concerning whether the University had "any legal basis" upon
which it could assure confidentiality. 0 8 He then concluded that the
accuracy of the University's contemplated testing procedures was not
a "major concern. '"809
Turning to the constitutionality of the program's mandatory
testing prong, he stated two conclusions. First, he reasoned that the
act of witnessing urination and the subsequent testing of that urine
"would normally be subject to constitutional protection as a warrantless intrusion into areas of legitimately held expectations of privacy." 310 Second, he reasoned that the contemplated testing should
be presumed unconstitutional on the ground that "as a warrantless
intrusion and seizure, the burden of persuasion regarding constitutionality rests with the state." ' 1
The University of Washington asserted two arguments in favor
of constitutionality. First, it argued that the program contemplates
only reasonable intrusions.3 12 Second, it argued that the program
was constitutional because university students have no constitutional
right to compete in intercollegiate athletics, and hence consent, involving no waiver of constitutional rights, was voluntary.1 3
Judge Mattson applied a balancing test. Balancing the "personal intrusion . . . against the University's interest in the test resuits,"' " and again emphasizing the need to urinate in front of a
witness, Judge Mattson found the contemplated level of intrusion unreasonable.318 He identified the University's interests as a) advancing
testee safety, b) advancing the safety of testees' teammates, c) promoting fairness in athletic competition, d) protection of the University's image, and e) protecting the economic viability of the University and its athletic programs, especially its lucrative football and
307. O'Hallorantranscript, supra note 262. See also Judge Halts Drug Tests at Washington, Wilmington News-Journal, July 24, 1987, at C7, col. 1; No Testing, USA Today, July
24, 1987, at CI, col. I; Colleges, Philadelphia Inquirer, July 24, 1987, at 10-C, col. 3.
308. O'Halloran transcript, supra note 262, at 4.
309. Id. at 5.

310. Id. at 6.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 9-13.
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basketball programs. 316
He concluded that the testing program would not further those
interests sufficiently to justify the intrusion involved, because the evidence was not persuasive that drug use by athletes had significantly
harmed the school's ability to promote its asserted interests.31 He
relied heavily on a finding that, because athletes would be given substantial notice, the program would "probably only detect the true
addict." 1 8 On these bases, he concluded that in the "absence of evidence of a significant drug problem among athletes in general, or
athletes at the University of Washington, and under circumstances
which make the test unlikely" to accomplish its goals, the intrusion
contemplated would be unreasonable. 1 9 He also concluded that it
was unlikely the program would accomplish safe and fair participa32 0
tion in sports events.
Judge Mattson then addressed the University's voluntariness argument. He noted that a prior Washington decision "provided that
consent to search must be freely and voluntarily given, and that such
consent must be proven by clear and convincing evidence."32 He
opined that those standards were not met in the case before him. 322
In support, he noted that participation in intercollegiate athletics
may be the necessary step to a future professional athletic career,
that a decision "tied to one's whole future career is . . . not . . .

made freely and voluntarily," and that the interest in competing is a
"major" interest.823 Having reasoned that the University of Washington bore the burden of proof and that its arguments were not
meritorious, Judge Mattson concluded that, as a matter of law, the
program violated both the fourth amendment and the state
316. Id. at 8-10.
317. Id. at 10-11. In fact, Judge Mattson noted that the University indicated awareness
of "only two confirmed instances in the last five and a half years in which an athlete's health
or competitive ability has been affected by drugs." Id. at 4. Judge Mattson also found that
there had been "no confirmed instances" in which an "athlete's drug use has endangered any
other person." Id.
318. Id. at 11.
319. Id. at 12. In support of his conclusion, he reasoned that evidence of a special drug
problem among athletes would be necessary to make that intrusion reasonable. Id. He opined
that this was particularly true in that a) no testing was planned of other University students
engaged in other activities also requiring performances unimpaired by drugs and b) mass testing of firefighters had been ruled unconstitutional in an earlier decision, though the state presumably has a greater interest in keeping firefighters' performances free of drugs than in keeping mere athletic performances free of drugs. Id. at 12-13.
320. Id. at 12-13.
321. Id. at 17.
322. Id.
323. Id.
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constitution.3 2 '
Judge Mattson then turned to the program's other testing provisions.325 He concluded that its voluntary testing provisions were constitutional and that the provisions mandating testing upon reasonable
suspicion were facially constitutional. 2 6 He opined, however, that
the constitutionality, as applied, of mandating testing upon "reasonable suspicion" rather than the higher standard of probable cause
would need to be addressed at a later time. 27
The NCAA was not a party in the action, and its program thus
not at issue. Nevertheless, Judge Mattson purported to rule on that
program's constitutionality. He stated:
It is clear that the NCAA's requirement of all athletes consenting in writing to random post season drug testing as a condition of the University's right to participate in post season championships and bowl events suffers from even more constitutional
deficiencies than does the University of Washington's proposed
program, which is much more structured and much more
limited.
The NCAA program tests for something like 3,000 drugs,
some of which are over-the-counter drugs, and it's a much more
comprehensive list of prohibited substances. The testing they
provide is not uniformly applied, as is the University's; nor is it
based upon individualized reasonable suspicion."
Judge Mattson advised counsel for the University that the University, to avoid being sanctioned by the NCAA, "should" move to
join the NCAA as a party. 2 9 He further stated that he would be
inclined to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the
NCAA to restrain the NCAA from requiring the University of
Washington to implement the NCAA's program or penalizing it for
not implementing the NCAA program.33
324.
325.

Id.
Id.

326. Id. at 18.
327. Id. at 18-20.
328. Id. at 20-21.
329. Id. at 21.
330. Id. at 21-22. Litigation in the case continues. Subsequent to his oral ruling in favor
of the plaintiffs, Judge Mattson did in fact order that the NCAA be joined as a third party
defendant. O'Halloran v. University of Washington, No. 87-2-08775-1 (Wash. Super., King
County, July 24, 1987) (Order Compelling Joinder). He also issued a TRO restraining the

NCAA from penalizing the University of Washington for not implementing its own or the
NCAA's testing program. O'Halloran v. University of Washington v. NCAA, No. 87-208775-1 (Wash. Super., King County, July 24, 1987) (Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause).
On July 30, 1987, the NCAA filed a petition to remove the case to federal court. Memo-
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Potential Sources. of Future Challenges.-Because reme-

dies were awarded under privacy provisions of state constitutions,
Levant and O'Halloranhighlight the potential future significance of
non-federal sources of privacy rights. Such sources include state constitutions, state statutes, local ordinances, and collective bargaining
agreements. This is true especially when such provisions afford more

extensive privacy rights than the fourth amendment. 33 '
Further highlighting these sources of potential future significance are a) two non-sports drug testing decisions discussing the impact of state constitutions, b) state statutory developments, and c) a
San Francisco City Attorney's opinion construing a San Francisco
municipal ordinance.
a. State Constitutions.-Two cases discussing the impact of
state constitutions are Guiney v. Roache 82 and Patchogue-Medford
Congress of Teachers v. Board of Education."'3

In Guiney a police officers' union challenged, under the fourth
and fourteenth amendments, a Boston police department rule authorizing urinalysis of employees on both a random and reasonable

suspicion basis.384 Though no privacy challenge to the rule was pending in any Massachusetts state court, the Federal District Court for
the District of Massachusetts declined to issue a ruling under the
federal constitution,33 5 citing the Pullman abstention test. 86
The District Court noted that although the search and seizure

provision of the Massachusetts Constitution is substantively similar
to the fourth amendment, Massachusetts state courts have construed
it differently. 8 7 Hence, the district court reasoned, a decision under
the state constitutional privacy provision could obviate the need for a
randum dated July 31, 1987 from Julya Hampton, Washington ACLU Legal Program Director, "Recent Ruling in O'Halloran v. University of Washington." The next day, attorneys for
the plaintiffs appeared before Judge Mattson to present the written order for entry of his July
23, 1987 oral ruling. Id. After argument, the court declined to enter a written order. The
University of Washington argued that the case was no longer properly before the court because of the removal petition. Id. Judge Mattson expressed concern about entering an order in
light of the recent development. Id. He apparently preferred not to create a situation which
would further complicate the issues in federal court. Id.
331. See Your Urine or Your Job, 19 Loy. LA. L. REV. 1451, 1482; Bamberger, Boosting Your Case With Your State Constitution, A.B.A. J. at 49, 50 (March 1986).

332. 654 F. Supp. 1287 (D. Mass. 1987).
333. 70 N.Y.2d 57, 510 N.E.2d 325, 517 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1987).
334. Guiney, 654 F. Supp. at 1288.
335. Id. at 1295-1304.
336. Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941). The Pullman abstention doctrine dictates
that in certain situations, a federal district court, in its discretion, may decline to proceed with
a case even though it has proper jurisdiction.
337. Guiney, 654 F. Supp. at 1298-99.
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ruling under the federal constitution.s8 8
In Patchogue, public school teachers challenged, under both the
fourth amendment and the privacy provision of the New York State
Constitution, the validity of a program of a state school district requiring probationary public school teachers to submit to compulsory
urinalysis, but requiring no individualized suspicion of drug use. 339
Under the New York Constitution, the appropriate standard is reasonable suspicion. 4 0 The court held that the program violated both
constitutions.3" In its opinion, the court noted that resort to the federal constitution would not necessarily be dispositive because practices permitted by the fourth amendment may not satisfy the requirements of article 1, section 12 of the New York Constitution.' 2
b. California Statutory Proposal.-A California statutory
proposal also highlights the potential significance in this area of alternate sources of privacy rights. A proposed drug testing amendment to California's Labor Code, introduced in the California General Assembly in 1985, would have required non-government
employers to 1) inform employees and applicants for employment of
the employer's policy regarding drug testing, 2) give employees advance notice that drug testing may be a routine part of their employment before requiring such testing, and 3) allow employees to choose
their own physicians, laboratories, clinics, or hospitals for administration of the tests."43 The proposed amendment died on January 30,
1986, pursuant to the California Constitution. "
c. San Francisco Ordinance.-The San Francisco Municipal
Code explicitly prohibits employers from imposing random or company-wide drug testing of employees.34 5 Absent preemption by a collective bargaining agreement, it permits testing only when "(a) the
employer has reasonable grounds to believe that an employee's faculties are impaired on the job; and (b) the employee is in a position
338. Id.
339. See supra note 333.
340. Patchogue, 70 N.Y.2d at , 510 N.E.2d at 328, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 459.
341. Id. at __, 510 N.E.2d at 328, 331, 517 N.Y.S.2d at -.
342. Id. at -,
510 N.E.2d at 328, 517 N.Y.S.2d at _. See also Bamburger,
Boosting Your Case With Your State Constitution, A.B.A. J. at 49, 50 (March 1986).
343. See Your Urine or Your Job, 19 Loy. LA. L. REV. 1451, 1461-62.
344. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 10(a).
345. San Francisco, Ca., POLICE CODE ch. 8, art. 33A, § 3300A.5 (1985); see also Your
Urine or Your Job, 19 Loy. LA. L. REV. 1451, 1462 n.68; Palefsky, Corporate Vice Precedents: The California Constitution and San Francisco's Worker Privacy Ordinance, 11 NOVA
L. REV. 669, 681-84 (Winter 1987).
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where such impairment presents a clear and present danger to the
physical safety of the employee, another employee, or to a member
' The ordinance, however, contains a "preemption"
of the public."346
exception, under which it is preempted by collective bargaining
agreements between employers and employee labor organizations. 4 7
The San Francisco City Attorney's office has issued an opinion

concerning the applicability of the ordinance to San Francisco's professional football team, the 49ers, and its major league baseball
team, the Giants. In The Application of San Francisco's Employee
Testing Ordinance to the San Francisco Giants Baseball Club and

San Francisco49ers Football Club," 's the San Francisco City Attorney concluded that the ordinance did not apply to the 49ers, reasoning that it was preempted by the NFL collective bargaining agreement that regulates drug testing of 49er players.3" 9 However, the
City Attorney determined that the ordinance did apply to the Giants
because "[tihere is no clause in the collective bargaining agreement
between Major League Baseball and the Major League Baseball
Players Association authorizing teams to test their players." 5 0 The
City Attorney concluded that the ordinance would not be preempted

by clauses in contracts between individual Giant players and their
team. 5 ' Finally, the City Attorney concluded that the ordinance applied to the Giants even when the testing would be performed

outside of San Francisco.852
Thus, under the City Attorney's analysis, had the insertion of
drug testing clauses into players' contracts by individual MLB teams
346.

See supra note 345.

347.

The ordinance's preemption provision states:
PREEMPTION. In adopting this Article, the Board of Supervisors does not
intend to regulate or affect the rights or authority of an employer to do those
things that are required, directed, or expressly authorized by federal or state law
or administrative regulation or by a collective bargaining agreement between an
employer and an employee labor organization. Further, in adopting this Article,
the Board of Supervisors does not intend to prohibit that which is prohibited by
federal or state law or administrative regulation or by a collective bargaining
agreement between an employer and an employee labor organization.

San Francisco POLICE CODE art. 33A, § 3300A.10 (1985). See also The Application of San
Francisco'sEmployee Testing Ordinance to the San FranciscoGiants Baseball Club and San

Francisco 49ers Football Club, San Francisco City Attorney Opinion No. 86-04 (March 28,
1987) [hereinafter City Attorney Opinion] at 9.
348. City Attorney Opinion, supra note 347.
349. Id. at 1.
350. Id. at 8. See also id. at 1.

351. Id.
352. Id. at 10-11. The City Attorney reasoned that "the City of San Francisco has a
more significant relationship with the Giants and its players than the jurisdiction in which the
players happen to be when the team chooses to test them and the City has a greater interest in
having its ordinance applied ..... Id. See also Palefsky, supra note 345, at 678 n.31.

DRUG TESTING IN SPORTS

not been invalidated by an arbitrator as violative of MLB's CBA, 53
the city ordinance would have provided an independent basis for
such invalidation as to players for the San Francisco Giants.354 However, under the City Attorney's analysis, the ordinance would not
provide a basis for challenging the NFL's drug testing program as to
49ers players.36 5
5. The "Privacy" Interest in Confidentiality
a. Shoemaker (Part II).-The plaintiffs in Shoemaker
claimed that the New Jersey horse racing program violated their
constitutional "privacy" rights by a) requiring them to disclose use
of certain medications, b) not adequately ensuring confidentiality, c)
not providing for confidentiality of breathalyzer results; and d) allowing breathalyzer testing in non-private settings 6 Both the District Court and Third Circuit characterized the "privacy" interest
' 3 57
claimed as an interest in "confidentiality.
Regarding claim a), the Third Circuit held that the state's interest in integrity justified its access to the medical information. 58
Regarding claim b), both the District Court and Third Circuit concluded that the confidentiality provisions of the program adequately
protected the plaintiffs' "privacy" rights in confidentiality.3 5 9 As to
claims c) and d), the district court held that information generated
by breathalyzer would have to be treated "in the same manner" as
information generated by urine tests and that the state would have
to administer breathalyzer tests privately, away from the view of
persons not required for administration of the tests. 6
b. Discussion.-The analysis of the district court and Third
Circuit on these claims suggests two conclusions. First, it suggests
that sports organizations will need to treat tests for alcohol "in the
same manner" as they treat urine tests. They will thus have to prevent unnecessary viewing of alcohol tests and keep the results confidential. Second, it suggests that programs containing similar confidentiality provisions will survive challenges based on plaintiffs'
353.

Roberts, supra note 108.

354. Palefsky, supra note 345, at 678 n.31.
355. Id.
356. Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089, 1105 (D. N.J. 1985).
357. The courts distinguished "confidentiality" from autonomy. Id.; Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1144 (3d Cir. 1986).
358. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1144.
359. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1144; 619 F. Supp. at 1105-07.
360. Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1107. These rulings were not addressed on appeal.
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constitutional rights of privacy.

B. Non-Privacy Claims: Shoemaker (Parts III and IV) & Barbay
1. Equal Protection: Shoemaker (Part III).-The jockey
plaintiffs in Shoemaker asserted two constitutional claims not based

on privacy or confidentiality considerations. They claimed that the
New Jersey horse racing drug testing program violated their right to
equal protection 61 because, as implemented, it subjected jockeys but not officials, trainers, and grooms, to whom it also applied - to
random urine tests and daily breathalyzer tests.3 62 The Third Circuit
rejected this claim, relying again on the paramount nature of the
state's interest in the appearance of integrity and the traditional

"one step at a time" equal protection rationale.363
The Third Circuit's use of an integrity interest to reject the
jockeys' equal protection claims emphasizes the weight it afforded
that interest. The court in fact altered the equal protection rationale
3 64
from safety to integrity.
Under the Third Circuit's equal protection analysis in Shoemaker, it is difficult to see how equal protection challenges to a
sports-related drug testing program could succeed.3 66 Combating

drug abuse is clearly a laudable goal. Hence, the "one-step-at-atime" rationale presents a formidable barrier to equal protection
challenges to drug testing programs.
2.

Due Process Right to a Hearing: Shoemaker (Part

IV).-The plaintiffs in Shoemaker also claimed that the program violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, contending that it did not expressly provide for a hearing at which they
361. In pertinent part, the fourteenth amendment states: "nor shall any State ... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend.
XIV, § 1.
362. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1143.
363. Id. at 1144. The court stated: "While the state's interest in the appearance of integrity reaches all participants, it is obviously greatest with respect to jockeys. The governing
equal protection principle is that the state may rationally take one step at a time."
364. Compare Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1105. The District Court had relied on a
state interest in jockey safety in rejecting the jockeys' equal protection claims rather than a
state interest in integrity.
365. Under the program contemplated by the University of Washington only studentathletes would have been tested. See supra note 319 and accompanying text. See also Memo
AH-30 of October 21, 1986 from [University of State of Washington] Ad Hoc Committee on
Drug Avoidance and Education Programs for Student Athletes to [University of State of
Washington] President William P. Gerberding; neither the Washington program nor the
NCAA Brochure discusses the possibility of testing non-athletes. See also supra note I and
accompanying text.
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could challenge the results of tests or any penalties imposed. 3" The
district court rejected this claim on the basis that the program did in
fact provide for such hearings. 6 ' It is unclear whether the plaintiffs
failed to raise this claim on appeal or whether the Third Circuit
merely rejected it without discussion. 368
3. Reputation and Defamation Claims: Barbay v. NCAA.-A
challenge alleging defamation and invasion of reputational rights
was brought against the NCAA's program by Roland Barbay, an

honorable mention All American defensive end on the 1986-87 Louisiana State University (LSU) football team.36 9 Barbay had been de-

clared ineligible for the January 1, 1987, Sugar Bowl because he had
tested positive for anabolic steroids.370 Despite conceding that he had
used steroids, Barbay brought suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 a11
seeking an injunction, preliminary injunction, or TRO precluding the
NCAA and LSU from preventing him from playing in the Sugar
Bowl. 721 Barbay did not claim that he would be denied a fundamental right by being denied a chance to play in that game.373 Rather,
he claimed that he had a property right in his reputation and that
his reputation would be damaged by the actions of the NCAA and
LSU if he was not permitted to play in the Sugar Bowl.37
The District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed Barbay's Section 1983 claims against the NCAA for lack of
state action. 70 The court concluded that LSU's action constituted
366. Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1104.
367. Id. (citing N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 70-13A.1 (1985)).
368. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1136.
369. Barbay v. NCAA, C.A. No. 86-5697 (E.D. La. January 20, 1987); see also Neff,
Bosworth Faces The Music, Sports Illustrated, January 5, 1987, at 20, 21.
370. Barbay, supra note 369, slip. op. at 3.
371. This provision states:
§ 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
usage, of any state or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceedings for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1986).
372. Barbay, supra note 369, slip op. at 1.
373. Id. at 7.
374. Id. at 7-8.
375. The court ruled that the NCAA's adoption, implementation, and enforcement of its
drug testing program did not meet section 1983's "state action" requirement. The court stated:
state regulation or subsidization of an institution will not create a section
1983 cause of action without further evidence .... There must be a further
showing that the state university caused or procured the adoption of the NCAA
regulations in question .... Barbay has never alleged nor sought to prove that
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However, the court also dismissed Barbay's claims

against LSU, concluding that Barbay had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the denial of a chance to play in the Sugar
Bowl would result in his being defamed or that his reputation would
be damaged. 77 The court denied Barbay's requests for equitable relief, finding that Barbay's inability to display his skills during the
1987 Sugar Bowl to professional scouts attending that game did not
constitute irreparable injury.878
Barbay highlights the difficulty amateur athletes, not protected
by collective bargaining agreements, may face when challenging
drug testing programs of non-governmental entities, who are not restricted by the fourth or fourteenth amendments or by Section 1983.
Also, the court's almost summary rejection of Barbay's defamation
and reputational claims suggests a likely lack of success of similar
challenges based on private tort law.879 Ironically, it may also foreshadow rejection of challenges to drug-testing programs by athletes,
LSU caused, directed, or controlled the implementation of these NCAA
regulations.
Id. at 7 (citations omitted).
This Article will not discuss at length the question of whether NCAA activity constitutes
state action. For discussions of "state action" and the NCAA, see McKenna, Age Limitations
and the NCAA: Discrimination or Equating Competition?, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. 379, 384-89
(1987) and McKenna, A Proposition With A Powerful Punch-The Legality and Constitutionality of NCAA Proposition 48, 26 DuQ. L. REV. 43 (1987).
376. Barbay, supra note 369, slip op. at 7.
377. Id. at 7-8. But see Buckton v. NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973). In
Buckton, the court stated:
Even the most blase and hardened campus observer would recognize the
obvious stigma that attaches to a declaration of athletic ineligibility, particularly
when such ineligibility is based on alleged professionalism, as opposed to more
routine academic insufficiency. A reasonable if not necessary implication would
be that plaintiffs lacked moral fiber because they took money under improper
circumstances. Such an implication would scar their reputations, not only on
their own campus but in athletic circles through the country, in a way that no
subsequent finding of eligibility would ever fully erase.
The same reasoning undoubtedly applies to ineligibility due to drug use.
378. Barbay, slip op. at 8. The court reasoned that professional scouts do not predicate
their "assessments and recommendations concerning a player solely on the basis of his performance in a post-season competition. Rather, such scouts normally form their opinions on
the basis of regular season games and practice sessions they have attended, along with game
films and interviews." But see Buckton v. NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973) on the
issue of irreparable harm. That court stated:
Moreover, the players would "have only one sophomore year in college and
a later finding in their favor could not restore the precious months that would
have been lost to them."
Id. at 1159-60.
The same reasoning could apply to a missed chance to play in the Sugar Bowl. As to the
potential harm to the NCAA, the Buckton court stated: "It certainly suffers no harm to its
reputation or authority by not punishing a member institution for obeying a court order." Id.
379. However, this is not necessarily true. Much of the reasoning in Buckton logically
applies in the drug testing context. See supra notes 377-78.
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based on image considerations such as the athletes' interest in the
public's perception of their integrity, despite the public nature of
their performances and the obvious importance to them in terms of
endorsements and fan appeal. 8 ' However, Barbay is distinguishable
from the non-consent cases. Barbay involved an athlete who only
sought to enjoin being penalized after testing positive.
C.

Contractual Claims

In employment settings, both athlete and non-athlete drug testing issues are likely to be resolved by collective bargaining agreements. 8 ' One commentator has opined that "[n]owhere has the process" of resolving the permissibility of drug testing through collective
bargaining "been under more public scrutiny than in the world of
professional sports."'8 2 Indeed, both Major League Baseball and the
National Football League have had drug testing disputes resolved on
the basis of their respective collective bargaining agreements.
1. Major League Baseball
a. The Roberts Decision.-In January 1986 the MLB Players'
Association (players) filed a grievance With an arbitration panel,
claiming that the negotiation of drug testing clauses into player contracts by clubs on an individual basis violated MLB's collective bargaining agreement and federal labor laws.38 3 The players contended
that such clauses could permissibly be inserted into player contracts
by individual clubs only if the players, through collective bargaining,
consented to such insertion. 38"
In July 1986, arbitrator Thomas Roberts ruled in favor of the
players, voiding over 550 drug testing clauses which had been inserted into players' contracts through individual player-team negotiations. 85
The players contended that individually negotiated drug testing
clauses violated Article II of the MLB CBA, which provides that the
380. There is an apparent fundamental inconsistency in affording weight to drug-testingrelated integrity/public perception interests asserted by management, as in Shoemaker, 795
F.2d at 1144, but not to similar interests asserted by athletes. See, e.g., supra note 10.
381. Bishop, supra note 115, at 31 (April 1986); Denenberg & Denenberg, Drug Testing From the Arbitrator's Perspective, 11 NOVA L. REv. 371 (Winter 1987).

382. Bishop, supra note 115 at 31.
383. Roberts, supra note 108. Shortly after his decision was rendered, the MLB player
relations committee owners fired Roberts as an MLB arbitrator. Wong & Ensor, supra note 5,
at 806.
384.
385.

Roberts, supra note 108.
Id.

92

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

SPRING

1988

Players' Union is "the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent
for all Major League Players . . .with regard to all terms and conditions of employment." '8 6 In response, the owners contended that
such clauses were covered under a "special covenant-additional benefit" exception to Article II, which permits individual negotiation of
covenants that "provide benefits beyond those found in the Uniform
Player's Contracts. 3 8 7
After noting that his role was contract construction, not advancement of the interests of baseball in general, 8 8 Roberts construed Article 11.38 " Turning first to its general import, he stated:
Article II on its face prohibits the individual negotiation of
special covenants uniform in nature and applicable to substantially all players who desire to negotiate a new contract so long
as those special covenants provide no actual or potential additional benefits to the player. A unilaterally imposed condition of
employment may not be sanctioned if it is inconsistent with the
provisions of the Basic Agreement or does not provide "additional benefits" to the player within the meaning of the phrase
as it appears in Article 11.890
Roberts then reasoned that under Article II,
the actual or potential additional benefit must run to the
player but not to the Club. That is to say, an individual special
covenant is not permitted where it benefits the Club and not the
player. The benefit may accrue to both the player and the Club
"
but not the Club alone.
The owners contended that drug testing clauses in non-guaranteed contracts constituted a benefit because they permitted a player
"to publicly disassociate himself from the specter of drugs."39 Apparently rejecting this contention, the decision states that in most
386. Id. at 2, 7, and 8.
387. Id. at 2. Roberts' decision states that "Article 1Iexempts from the stated bargaining authority of the Players Association special covenants which actually or potentially provide
benefits to a player beyond those found in the Uniform Player's Contract." Id.
388. Id. at 3.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 5.
391. Id.
392. Roberts, supra note 108, at 6. This is an interesting twist on management's different, more frequently asserted integrity-fan appeal interest. The owners purported to assert
such an interest on behalf of the players. Their apparent logic is that being tested increases an
athlete's appearance of integrity and fan appeal. However, the athlete in Barbay appeared to
argue that being subjected to testing programs decreases an athlete's appeal. Management's
standing to assert player "integrity" interests aside, an interesting issue arises: whether players
have a stronger "integrity" interest in being tested or not being tested. See supra note 10.
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cases such clauses were "a necessary constituent part of the contract
of employment and thereby something less than voluntary." 393 Noting the recent proliferation of such clauses, Roberts concluded that
"the reach of the testing language to more than five hundred Uniform Player's Contracts in a single winter of negotiations makes it
clear that a term and condition of employment is being defined."39
The owners also contended that such clauses constituted an Article II "benefit" because they would deter drug abuse and because
non-compliance would carry "no detrimental result under a nonguaranteed contract."8 95 Roberts rejected this contention as well,
stating simply that "whatever may be said of the value of such tests
they cannot be construed as a 'benefit' within the meaning of Article
396
II."
He thus concluded that the insertion of individually negotiated drug testing clauses into non-guaranteed contracts violated Ar97
ticle 11.3
He then addressed the validity of insertion of such clauses into
guaranteed contracts. He first noted that "[a]t risk . . . is the

forefeiture of significant sums of money" when a multi-year salary
guarantee is conditioned upon the agreement of the player to submit
to "any test or examination for drug use when requested by the
club."" 8
In support of their guaranteed contract argument, the owners
pointed out that Paragraph 5(b) of the Uniform Player's Contract
"contains a commitment by the player that he will not engage in
certain hazardous activities without the written consent of the
club." '99 Roberts concluded, however, that Paragraph 5(b), unlike
the drug testing clauses at issue, created no affirmative duty to produce urine samples absent cause. 00
The owners also sought to establish that drug testing clauses
were a benefit by linking them to the guaranteed nature of a player's
salary.' 01 They argued that drug testing clauses must be viewed as a
benefit as "part and parcel of the guaranteed salary benefit found
in" guaranteed contracts. 02 Roberts reasoned that a similar argu393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

Roberts. supra note 108, at 6.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ment had been rejected in an earlier MLB arbitration decision," 3
which had concluded that "the special covenant clause under examination must on its own provide actual or potential additional benefits
to the player."'' He concluded:
In the present case the drug testing clause has been found
not to provide either actual or potential benefits. It follows that
the drug testing clauses may not be brought into compliance
with Article II through the device of relating them to other
clauses that do in fact afford a benefit.' 5
Hence, he held that the insertion of individually negotiated drug
testing clauses into guaranteed contracts also violated Article 11.406
2. Professional Football.-The July 1986 "augmented" drug
testing program announced by NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle has
also been challenged, with partial success, based on player rights
under the 1982 NFL CBA.'10 The right of individual teams to require players to undergo postseason testing absent an individualized
suspicion of drug use was also successfully challenged on the basis of
the CBA.'0 8
a. Club Postseason Testing. - The Kagel Decision.-In a decision dated October 20, 1986, arbitrator Sam Kagel addressed
whether individual NFL clubs could require players to undergo postseason testing, absent an individualized suspicion of drug use, without violating the 1982 NFL CBA. °9 The dispute was triggered by
events which occurred in December 1985 near the end of the NFL
regular season. The St. Louis Cardinals conducted physicals three
days before their final regular season game, and management attempted to test Cardinal players for drugs at that time." 0 The players refused to be tested."' Four other clubs also attempted to test
403. Id. at 7-8, (citing Panel Decision No. 44).
404. Id. at 8 (citing Panel Decision No. 44) (emphasis added).
405. Id.
406. The players have also filed a grievance for arbitration of the discipline, which includes drug testing, that Commissioner Ueberroth imposed on the players involved with the
trial of Curtis Strong. Wong & Ensor, supra note 5, at 804. Commissioner Ueberroth had
given each of those players the option of selecting between a small number of penalties as a
result of being involved with drugs. One of the options given each player included submitting
to random drug testing for the remainder of his career. Id. at 802-03. As of this writing that
grievance remains pending.
407. Kasher I, supra note 113.
408. Kagel, supra note 113.
409. Id. at 4.
410. Id.
411. Id.
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players during their postseason physicals.412 All players on three of
the clubs refused to be tested, and some of the players on the fourth
similarly refused."' All players on all five clubs who refused to be

tested were fined $1,000."' In arguing that such testing was permissible, the NFL Management Council ("Owners") relied on Article

XXXI, section 5 of the 1982 CBA, Article I, section 4 of the CBA,
and Paragraph 8 of the standard NFL Player Contract." 5

Arguing to the contrary, the Players Association ("Players") relied primarily on the CBA's "Zipper Clause," which states that the
CBA "represents the complete understanding of the parties on all

subjects covered herein" and that there will be no change in the
terms and conditions of that Agreement without mutual consent." 6
Their argument was that since the CBA represented the parties'
complete agreement, but did not explicitly allow such postseason
4 17
testing, such testing was prohibited.

Finding the text of none of these provisions dispositive, arbitrator Kagel undertook a comprehensive chronological examination of
the bargaining history underlying them."" He found that the bargaining history established that the parties had understood that clubs

could test for drugs only during the preseason physical and for reasonable cause." 9 On this basis he concluded that club-conducted
testing for drugs during players' postseason physicals violated the
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 10.
415. Art. XXXI, § 5 empowers clubs to conduct physicals but not explicitly to test for
drugs during those physicals. 1982 NFL CBA, supra note 110, Art. XXXI, § 5. Art. I, § 4 is
the CBA's "Management Rights" provision. Id. Art. 1, § 4. It reserves the League's 28 clubs'
rights not "specifically limited" by the CBA. Id. Art. I, § 4. Paragraph 8 in the standard NFL
Player Contract requires players a) to stay in excellent physical condition, b) to submit to
physical examinations upon club requests, c) to fully disclose physical or mental conditions
known to them which might impair performance; and d) to respond fully and in good faith
when questioned by club physicians about such conditions. It provides:
8. PHYSICAL CONDITION. Player represents to club that he is and will
maintain himself in excellent physical condition. Player will undergo a complete
physical examination by the Club physicians upon Club request, during which
physical examination Player agrees to make full and complete disclosure of any
physical or mental condition known to him which might impair his performance
under this contract and to respond fully and in good faith when questioned by
the Club physician about such condition. If Player fails to establish or maintain
his excellent physical condition to the satisfaction of the Club physician, or make
the required full and complete disclosure, then Club may terminate this
contract.
1982 NFL CBA appendix M, reprinting NFL player contract referred to in Article XII of that
CBA.
416. 1982 NFL CBA, supra note 110, Art. 11, § 1. See Kagel, supra note 113, at 12.
417. Kagel, supra note 113, at 12-13.
418. Id. at 13-33.
419. Id. at 31.
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'
CBA's "Zipper Clause."42

b. Rozelle's Augmented Program: Kasher I.-In a separate
decision dated October 25, 1986, arbitrator Richard R. Kasher addressed the validity under the 1982 NFL CBA of Pete Rozelle's July
1986 augmented program.4 2' Kasher upheld most provisions of the
augmented program, but invalidated its mandate of two unscheduled
tests during the regular season.42
The Players again relied primarily on the CBA's Zipper
Clause. 428 The NFL and NFL Management Council ("Owners") relied on the Commissioner's power to protect the integrity of and public confidence in the game of professional football.42 4 They also relied
on the Commissioner's past practices, including at least seven instances in which he had, pursuant to his disciplinary powers, required players to submit to urine testing as a condition of continued

employment in the NFL.425
Kasher, like Kagel and Roberts, commenced his analysis by
clarifying that his narrow role was simply to interpret the parties'
agreement.4 26 He found that the Players had presented prima facie

evidence that drug abuse education, testing, and rehabilitation had
been matters of collective bargaining before the 1982 CBA had been
agreed on, and hence, that those subjects had been incorporated into
the CBA.427 On that basis, he shifted onto the NFL and the Owners
the burden of showing that the CBA, pursuant to its Zipper Clause,
did not "exclusively control the rights, responsibilities and actions of
420. Id. at 33.
421. Kasher 1. supra note 113.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 20-21.
424. Id. at 27-42, 61. The NFL Constitution & Bylaws Article 8.13(A) empower the
Commissioner to impose discipline for "conduct detrimental to the welfare of the league or
professional football." NFL CBA Article VIII, § I and Article VII, § II empower him to
resolve disputes concerning issues involving, or conduct detrimental to, "the integrity of, or
public confidence in, the game of professional football." Rozelle's July 1986 press release concerning his augmented program states that he acted under Article 8.13(A) and Article VIII's
integrity provisions in announcing the augmented program. Rozelle Release, supra note 122,
at 2.
Article VIII, § 8.3(e) of the NFL Constitution empowers the Commissioner to arbitrate
disputes concerning conduct he considers "detrimental to the best interests of the League or
professional football." Rozelle Release at 2; Kasher I, supra note 113, at 6. Finally, Article
VIII, § 8.5 of the NFL Constitution empowers the Commissioner to "establish policy and
procedure in respect to the provisions of the Constitution and By-Laws and any enforcement
thereof." Kasher 1, supra note 113, at 6-7. This latter provision is perhaps more significant
than the others in that it empowers the Commissioner to establish policy and procedure rather
than merely impose discipline or arbitrate disputes.
425. Kasher I at 37.
426. Id. at 43, 69.
427. Id. at 60.
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the parties" as to drug testing.42 8 He concluded that although the

Commissioner retained "broad and special powers to deal with issues
that involved the 'integrity of the game,' " those powers were "im-

pacted by the collective bargaining relationship" and hence "not plenary in nature. '"429

Examining the parties' bargaining history, Kasher concluded
that a trade-off had occurred as to drug testing. 43 0 He concluded
that the Commissioner's rulemaking authority had been supplanted

in certain respects by Article XXXI of the CBA, which he characterized as "establish[ing] clear procedures concerning the chemical

dependency program, testing and the confidentiality of medical report type of materials."'3 However, he concluded that "as a necessary corollary," the Players had conceded certain authority to the
Commissioner to establish policies and procedures and to address
and resolve matters affecting the integrity of and public confidence
in professional football. 3 2
Having thus found no complete conflict, he turned to the question of which provisions in the augmented program conflicted with
the CBA. 33 Turning first to the augmented program's mandate of

unscheduled testing,' 3 ' Kasher distinguished unscheduled testing
from random testing,'43 5 reasoning that "unscheduled" testing is not
428. Id.
429. Kasher then disposed of a potential alternative Players' argument: that even if Rozelle's augmented program did not conflict with the CBA, it should be invalidated as "arbitrary and unreasonable." Id. at 63. He concluded that "with the possible exception of the
NFL's intention to conduct two (2) unscheduled urinalysis tests during the regular season,
• . . the augmented program appears to be reasonable on its face." Id. Thus deemed facially
reasonable were the timing of the announcement of the augmented program, its intention to
centralize drug education and testing, and its provisions imposing severe penalties for breaches
of confidentiality. Id. at 63-64. Kasher concluded that despite the augmented program's facial
reasonableness, the augmented program was "a document affecting the terms and conditions
of employment of NFL players," and hence that it was superseded where it conflicted with
specific provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 64.
430. Id. at 66.
43 I.Id.
432. Id. at 66-67. At this point Kasher rejected the Player's argument that implementation of the augmented program would violate federal labor laws. He concluded that no such
violation would occur because the augmented program contained provisions which "go beyond,
and which are not on their face contradictory to, the somewhat skeletal provisions of Article
XXXI" of the CBA. Id. at 67.
433. Id. at 68.
434. The July 1987 release stated that Commissioner Rozelle was "augmenting the National Football League's drug program of testing, education, treatment and discipline with the
following steps:
2. Requiring more frequent urine testing, including two unscheduled tests during the regular season for every player in the league."
Rozelle Release, supra note 122, at I.
435. Kasher 1, supra note 113, at 70.
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"random" because "all players in the league would have been sub-

ject to [unscheduled] testing without exception." 486 He concluded
that "unscheduled" testing was not "addressed, contemplated, or
permitted" by Article XXXI.13 7 Again resorting to the parties' bargaining history, Kasher found a second quid pro quo, opining that
the Players had "finally conceded to certain testing," but had "qualified the right of the club to test by requiring that 'there will not be
any spot checking for chemical abuse or dependency by the club or
club physician.' "48

Analyzing the structure of Article XXXI, Kasher concluded
that although its "spot" checking prohibition explicitly applies only

to checking by clubs or club physicians, implicitly it applied to testing by the league as well.439 Pursuant to this analysis, Kasher concluded that "unscheduled" testing by the league was prohibited by
4 n
Article XXXI.O
Kasher next addressed the validity of the augmented program's
requirement that draft-eligible college players be tested at annual
Timing and Testing sessions.4 4 1 He construed the augmented program to require all draft-eligible players attending scouting combine
sessions to undergo urinalysis and to execute release forms permitting disclosure of the urinalysis results to the NFL drug advisor and
to each club before the college draft of that year.442 He construed
the Rozelle Release to provide also that draft-eligible players who
tested positive at the scouting organizations' sessions could be required to submit to reasonable cause testing at any time during the
next year, after signing an NFL Player Contract.4 43
Finally, Kasher concluded that those provisions of the aug436.
437.
testing by
438.
439.

Id.
Id. Art. XXXI, § 7 prohibits "spot" testing by clubs. It does not expressly address
the league.
Id. at 70-71.
Id. Kasher wrote:
The "spot checking" prohibition directly follows that sentence in section 7
of Article XXXI which allows the club physician, upon reasonable cause, to direct a player to [a facility] for chemical abuse or dependency programs. In our
opinion, the NLFPA ensured that spot checking was not to be permitted as part
of the "reasonable cause" testing right, which the NFLMC obtained for the
member clubs as a result of its July 23, 1982 proposal. Accordingly, we find that
the "spot checking" prohibition modifies the clubs' rights to conduct reasonable
cause testing and is not properly construed as the "only" prohibition on the
league's or the clubs' right to test for chemical use or dependency.
Id. at 71.
440. Id. at 72.
441. Id. at 74.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 75.

DRUG TESTING IN SPORTS

mented program did not conflict with the CBA. He reasoned that
draft-eligible players are not yet members of a bargaining unit covered by the CBA and a positive drug test constituted reasonable
cause to require the individual who so tested to submit to urinalysis
at any time during the next year.44
IV.

Conclusion

Attempts to implement drug testing programs in sports have
rapidly proliferated to such an extent that virtually every athlete recognizable to fans in this country beyond the high school level has
been affected by them. As Part II of this Article illustrates, sportsrelated drug testing programs commonly contain a number of typical
provisions. Though such programs have been challenged on a number of grounds, clearly the main subject of dispute is the permissibility of testing in the first place. In general, the permissibility of voluntary445 and reasonable cause 4 6 testing is accepted. The permissibility
of such programs has implications concerning the permissibility of
drug testing in non-sports contexts, and the permissibility of testing
for substances other than drugs, such as the AIDS antibodies. With
such widespread effect and implications at stake, crucial is the development of general principles to govern the permissibility of involun444. id. In his October 25, 1986 decision, Kasher did not address the validity of the
provisions in the augmented program assigning to Dr. Tennant and SKBL the "responsibility
for administering urine testing of draft-eligible college players at the annual Timing and Testing sessions in February, and of NFL players at preseason training camps and in cases of
reasonable cause." Rozelle Release, supra note 122, at 1. Instead, in Kasher i, Kasher directed
the parties to "delineate specific responsibilities" which the NFL drug advisor might "properly
fulfill within the interface of the augmented drug program and Article XXXI." Kasher I,
supra note 113.
Rozelle's July 1986 release states that "any club that publicly divulges, directly or indirectly, that a player has tested positive at the timing and testing sessions or otherwise breaches
the confidentiality provisions of the augmented program will be subject to a fine of up to
$50,000." Rozelle Release, supra note 122, at 1. Kasher concluded that this provision was
consistent with the CBA. Kasher I at 77. Nonetheless, he recommended to the parties that "in
their efforts to properly interface those responsibilities of Dr. Tennant which are not in conflict
with the collective bargaining agreement, they address the question of confidentiality so that
the rights of all individuals may be protected." Id.
The parties failed to agree on a job description for Dr. Tennant. Consequently, on January 18, 1987, Kasher issued a second arbitration decision, providing such a job description. In
The Matter Of A Clarification Of An Arbitration Award Involving The NFLPA, NFLMC,
and NPL, (January 18, 1987) (Kasher, arb.) (unpublished decision) [hereinafter Kasher II].
445. O'Halloran transcript, supra note 262, at 18; 1982 NFL CBA Art. XXXI, § 5.
NBA Release-Overview, supra note 155; Memorandum of Agreement Between MLB Clubs
and MLBPA, dated May 24, 1984, at 3.
446. O'Halloran transcript, supra note 262 at 18; NFL CBA, Art. XXXI, § 7, NBA
Release-Overview. supra note 155, Memorandum of Agreement Between MLB Clubs and
MLBPA, dated May 24, 1984, at 5.
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tary, non-cause testing. 41
Sports managements have asserted two primary interests supporting permissibility-safety""8 and the public appearance of integrity, creating a positive image and fan appeal. " 9 Two safety interests
are articulable-testee safety and non-testee (public) safety. If a
sport sufficiently endangers its participants, and a drug-affected performance would sufficiently increase the level of danger, an interest
in testee safety justifies involuntary, non-cause testing."5" Whether
drugs present a significant threat to athletes' safety, health, and
competitive abilities is essentially an evidentiary matter upon which
authorities, thus far, have disagreed.' 51 Few athletic performances,
even if affected by drugs, endanger the public. 5 2 Hence, an interest
in public safety rarely justifies involuntary, non-cause testing.
Professional sports management organizations exist for their
own self-interests, economic and otherwise. They thus have a selfinterest in maintaining fan appeal through maintaining the public
appearance of integrity. In sports where safety considerations are not
447. This was the primary issue in Shoemaker, Levant, O'Halloran, Roberts; Kasher 1;
and Kagel.
448. See, e.g., the district court's opinion in Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1102, 1105;
Miller, Mandatory Urinalysis Testing And The Privacy Rights of Subject Employees: Toward A General Rule of Legality Under the Fourth Amendment, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 201,
217-18 n.73 (1986); id. at 221, discussing Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 491
(N.D. Ga. 1985); Kasher 1, supra note 113, at 30, 31.
449. See Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142, 1144; Wong & Ensor, supra note 5, at 783 n.8,
786-87 n.27, 795-96 n.83, 797 n.88, 799-800 n.106, 800-801 n.107, 803 n. 120; Roberts, supra
note 108, at 3 (quoting drug testing clause in non-guaranteed contracts), 6; Kasher 1, supra
note 113, at 28-31, 37-39.
Other public professions also evince concern for the appearance of integrity. For instance,
the legal profession has rules specifically designed to foster public confidence in the integrity of
lawyers. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 9, DR 9-101, E.C. 506, 9-2,
9-3, 9-5 (1984); CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canons 1, 2, 5(c)(1).
Grave concern is expressed, justifiably, when the appearance of judicial integrity is compromised. Judges Before the Bar-Excerpts from the Judicial Review Board Opinion, Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 6, 1987, at 16-A, col. 1. The integrity of other public officials also
presents cause for concern. See New York Makes History, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1987, at A-9,
col. 1.
450. Boxing and automobile racing certainly fit into this category. Horse racing is sometimes listed as dangerous to participants. Shoemaker, 619 F. Supp. at 1102, 1105; lmwinkelried, Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Wisdom of Governmental Prohibition or Regulation of Employee Urinalysis Testing, 11 NOVA L. REV. 563, 572-73 (Winter 1987); Oates,
Kid Dynamite, Life Magazine, 54-66 (March 1987) (Boxing ranks behind football, horse racing, sports car racing, and mountain climbing in annual number of fatalities). However, the
Third Circuit's ruling in Shoemaker was not based on safety considerations. 795 F.2d 1136
(3d Cir. 1986).
451. Compare O'Halloran transcript, supra note 262, with Wong & 'Ensor, supra note
5, at 798.
452. Sports is distinguishable on this basis from other public occupations such as
firefighting, police work, driving mass transit vehicles, or even teaching, as drug-affected teaching would impair students' learning. A possible exception is automobile racing.
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dispositive, the question becomes whether that self-interest justifies
involuntary, non-cause testing.
In professional sports, that question should be resolved through
collective bargaining. Players have an interest in not being tested involuntarily without cause. However, even constitutionally protected
interests may be waived.' 53 The process of collective bargaining affords both sides the best opportunity to articulate and weigh their

respective interests, decide when and for what to compromise, and
when to remain steadfast. It presents the best opportunity to reach a
quid pro quo which, taking into account the unique interests of each
side, is both definitive and satisfactory to both sides. Much more

than a judicial opinion, over which the parties have less control, the
process of collective bargaining allows the parties mutually to draft a
contract which spells out precisely which types of testing are permis-

sible and which are not. 45 ' Simply, if, as management asserts, its
interest in integrity, wholesomeness, fan appeal, or other image considerations suffices to justify involuntary, non-cause testing, let management prove it by writing such a testing clause into an agreement
with the players.

55

Difficulties arise in professional sports not governed by CBAs if
safety considerations are not dispositive.' 5 In such situations courts
should analyze the facts of each case to determine whether a) there
is introduced persuasive evidence of the type specified below or b) in
accordance with waiver decisional law, the potential testees have
waived their objections to testing.' 57 As in other waiver contests, the
burden should be on the party asserting the waiver to prove it. 45 8
Amateur sports presents a different situation. Unlike profes453. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1046 (1983).
454. Significantly, the NBA's agreement, unlike the programs enacted without collective
bargaining such as horse racing's, the NCAA's, and the University of Washington's, has not
been challenged.
San Francisco's drug testing ordinance, by deferring to collective bargaining agreements,
recognizes that resolution should, if possible, be through collective bargaining. SAN FRANCISCO
POLICE CODE, Chapter VIII, § 3300A.10 (1985).
455. Challenges to involuntary, non-cause testing by NFL players resulted because the
type of testing sought to be imposed was not expressly addressed by the NFL CBA. Kasher 1,
supra note 113; Kagel, supra note 113. The current stalemate in baseball exists because management, not content with voluntary and reasonable cause testing, yet lacking a compelling
interest in safety which would be significantly affected, seeks more than its "integrity" interests justify.
456. Shoemaker possibly represents such a situation. No governing collective bargaining
agreement was in effect, yet the Third Circuit did not find safety considerations dispositive.
See Shoemaker, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
457. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
458. See, e.g., Deputy v. State, 500 A.2d 581, 591 (Del. 1985); Wainwright v. State,
504 A.2d 1096, 1101 (Del. 1986).
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sional sports organizations, amateur sports management organizations exist, in theory, to benefit the athletes, not promote their own
self-interests. Hence, in theory, they have little self-interest in promoting athletes' fan appeal and little interest in conducting involuntary, non-cause testing other than the safety and integrity interests
of the athletes themselves.' 5
Also, collective bargaining does not occur in amateur sports.
Thus, in amateur sports, the permissibility of drug testing programs
should depend on a careful weighing of each side's interests. The
relevant question is whether documented, persuasive evidence shows
that lack of testing of the athletes to be tested presents a significant
threat to a) the safety of the specific athelete to be tested; b) the
safety of the specific athletes against whom he or she competes; c)
the safety of identifiable others; or d) the integrity of the outcome of
the specific competition(s) in which the athlete to be tested is to
participate.'60
Absent an individualized reasonable suspicion of drug use by
the potential testee, such evidence will be rare. Unless such persuasive evidence is presented, drug testing of amateur athletes should be
permitted only where a) it is voluntary; b) it is based on reasonable
cause; or c) the sport is persuasively demonstrated to be dangerous.
Probably prophetic is the following:
"There are only two segments of society who will benefit
from [drug testing], the testing industry and the lawyers who
will litigate it.""'

459. The argument that such testing itself constitutes a benefit to athletes is disingenuous, and was properly rejected by baseball arbitrator Roberts. Roberts, supra note 108, at 6-8.
460. One commentator suggests that employers be prepared to produce "documented
reports of job-related impairment or performance deficits so serious that substance abuse was a
plausible explanation." Denenberg & Denenberg, Drug Testing From the Arbitrators' Perspective, II NOVA L. REV. 371, 392 (Winter 1987).
461. Alan Page, former defensive lineman for the Minnesota Vikings and now a lawyer,
addressing an American Bar Association convention. Drug Testing Problems, N.Y. Times,

August 12, 1987, at B12, col.

